Gazprom Brings Chona Fields Online as Russia's Eastern Gas Bet Deepens

Gazprom Brings Chona Fields Online as Russia's Eastern Gas Bet Deepens New Eastern Siberian production feeds a pipeline network nearing capacity while Power of Siberia 2 remains stalled on pricing. Gazprom has started production at the Chona fields in Eastern Siberia, adding new upstream volumes to a region that has become central to Russia's post-European gas strategy. The fields feed into the Power of Siberia pipeline system, which delivered 38 billion cubic metres of gas to China last year and is projected to increase exports by over 20% this year, reaching its maximum contractual capacity.^7,2¹ That matters because Gazprom is running out of room on its only functioning eastbound export route. Power of Siberia 1 is approaching its 38 bcm annual ceiling. Putin and Xi agreed in September to raise that to 44 bcm per year, but even with the uplift, the pipeline cannot absorb the kind of volumes Russia once sold westward to Europe.^2,5 The Chona start-up is part of Gazprom's effort to fill that constrained pipe to the brim. Eastern Siberian fields along the Power of Siberia corridor have been brought online in sequence as the pipeline ramped toward full utilisation. New production is welcome for Gazprom's output figures, which have been heading the wrong way. Bloomberg reported that Russia produced approximately 334.8 billion cubic metres of natural and associated gas in the first half of the year, a decline of 3.2% compared to the same period last year.¹ The production drop is not just a pipeline story. Russian LNG output fell 5.1% in the same period, totalling around 16.5 million tons according to federal statistics. Sanctions-related constraints on liquefaction capacity and shipping have limited Gazprom's ability to monetise gas through the spot LNG market, making pipeline exports to China even more critical.¹ But China is not replacing Europe. That is the uncomfortable arithmetic. Even at full capacity, Power of Siberia 1 moves 38 bcm per year. Russia was sending roughly 150 bcm annually to Europe before the war. The 10 bcm Sakhalin pipeline under joint construction with China adds a fraction more. The gap is enormous.^2,1 Power of Siberia 2 was supposed to close part of that gap. The 2,600-kilometre system, designed to transport 50 bcm annually from Russia's Arctic Yamal fields to China via Mongolia, would more than double eastbound pipeline capacity. Russia and China reached a "general understanding" on the project during the Putin-Xi summit in Beijing. But key details and a timetable still needed to be agreed. That language has not changed in over a year.^2,3⁶ The sticking point is price. Power of Siberia 1 is approaching contractual capacity under terms widely reported to favour Beijing. CNPC has little incentive to rush a second pipeline deal when it already has diversified supply. Three pipelines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan deliver over 40 bcm annually to China's Xinjiang region. The 793-kilometre Myanmar-China pipeline, operational since 2013, was designed for 12 bcm per year. China's total pipeline gas imports reached 59.4 million tons in 2025. Russia is one supplier among several.^2,5 China's 15th five-year plan, released in March, committed only to advancing "early-stage" work on Power of Siberia 2. That is planning language, not construction language. For Gazprom, the distinction is expensive. Each year of delay means another year of stranded upstream capacity in Western Siberia and the Yamal peninsula, fields developed for a European market that no longer exists.² The Chona start-up is operationally straightforward. Gazprom knows how to bring Eastern Siberian fields online. But the strategic context is what gives it weight. Every new field tied to Power of Siberia 1 deepens Gazprom's dependence on a single export corridor that is nearly full, serving a single buyer that is in no hurry to agree on a second pipe. The original Gazprom-CNPC framework envisaged 30 bcm per year for 30 years, with exports initially forecast to begin in late 2015. The actual start came in December 2019, years behind schedule. Power of Siberia 2 is following a similar pattern of announcement, delay, and renegotiation.⁴ For the global gas market, the question is whether Russia's eastward pivot can ever deliver volumes large enough to matter for global balances. At 38 bcm, Power of Siberia 1 at capacity is roughly equivalent to a single large LNG export terminal. At 88 bcm with a hypothetical Power of Siberia 2, Russia would have a meaningful Asian presence. Without it, the lost European volumes remain exactly that. The next signal to watch is whether the Sakhalin pipeline construction accelerates and whether any concrete Power of Siberia 2 timeline emerges beyond the current "early-stage" language in Beijing's five-year plan. Until then, Chona fields produce into a pipe that is almost full, for a buyer that knows it holds the stronger hand.^2,5