Sinopec Approved for $6 Billion Uzbekistan Project as China Builds Central Asian Energy Base
Beijing's expanding investment in Central Asian supply chains strengthens its position in stalled Power of Siberia 2 pricing talks with Russia.
Sinopec has received approval to implement a project worth more than $6 billion in western Uzbekistan, oilprice.com reported on Friday (2026-08-21), extending China's industrial reach into a region where Russia has long held dominant commercial influence.5
The scale of Chinese energy commitment in Central Asia is widening on multiple fronts. KazTransOil data show Kazakhstan's oil exports to China via the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline rose 43 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2026, reaching 916,000 tons. Both developments come as Moscow and Beijing have yet to settle commercial terms on Power of Siberia 2, the proposed 2,600-kilometre pipeline designed to carry 50 bcm of Russian Arctic gas per year through Mongolia to China.5,1
Russia and China endorsed the Power of Siberia 2 project in late August 2025, with Gazprom noting on Tuesday (2025-08-26) that pricing had not been agreed. An MOU for construction was signed around September 2025. Vladimir Putin subsequently visited Beijing during the week of 2026-05-18 for talks with President Xi Jinping at which the pipeline was discussed in detail. Russia said a general understanding was reached, but key commercial details and a timetable still needed to be agreed, according to Reuters. China's 15th five-year plan, released in March 2026, committed only to "early-stage" work on the pipeline.3,4,2,1
China is not supply-constrained while those talks proceed. Three pipelines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan already cross Kazakhstan to enter China's Xinjiang region, supplying more than 40 bcm of natural gas annually. China's total natural gas imports through pipelines reached 59.4 million tons in 2025. Russia and China are also jointly constructing a 10-bcm route from Sakhalin island, and the Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline, 793 kilometres long and operational since 2013, was designed for 12 bcm per year.1
Power of Siberia 1 delivered 38 bcm from Russia to China in 2025. The two sides agreed at their September 2025 meeting to expand that line to 44 bcm per year — a volume increment that required no new pricing negotiation and offered Gazprom a near-term boost while the larger deal stayed open.1,3
Sinopec's Uzbekistan project sits within the geography that feeds the existing Central Asia-China network. Western Uzbekistan is an origin point for gas that transits Kazakhstan before entering China's Xinjiang region. Whether the $6 billion commitment covers upstream gas production, midstream processing, or export infrastructure has not been reported — each would carry different implications for how much supply China could eventually control in that basin.5,1
Russia's urgency around Power of Siberia 2 exceeds Beijing's. Gazprom's Arctic Yamal fields earmarked for the pipeline need a long-term buyer at scale, and China remains the only plausible candidate. But China already receives more than 40 bcm per year from Central Asian producers, is absorbing a 43-percent jump in Kazakh pipeline oil, and is now committing $6 billion in Sinopec capital in Uzbekistan. Moscow's room to hold out on price narrows with each new commitment Beijing makes in the region.2,1,5
The Sinopec deal appeared in the same oilprice.com article that noted Uzbekistan has reportedly taken delivery of four Chinese-made Chengdu J-10CE multi-role combat aircraft, citing photographs. Russia has historically dominated arms supply across Central Asia. Chinese energy capital and Chinese military hardware reaching the same country simultaneously represent a concrete shift in regional alignment.5
The immediate unknown is the Sinopec project's scope. An upstream gas development in western Uzbekistan would add Chinese-controlled production to the basin already feeding the Central Asia-China pipelines — a more significant strategic commitment than processing or transport infrastructure, and one that would hand Beijing an additional supply data point when Power of Siberia 2 pricing negotiations eventually demand a number.5,1