Tajikistan Triples Non-Russian Fuel Imports as Moscow's Refinery Losses Deepen
Ukraine's drone campaign has stripped Russia of a fifth of its refining capacity, forcing Central Asian states to find alternative fuel suppliers.
Tajikistan in July tripled fuel imports from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, totalling 34,000 tons compared with June's figures, Reuters reported — a small volume in absolute terms but a concrete sign that landlocked Central Asian states are moving away from Russian supply.6
Russia has lost roughly one-fifth of its refining capacity since the war began, falling from about 5.2 million barrels a day before the invasion to 3.8 million now, according to a study by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. The trigger is Ukraine's long-range drone campaign, which has hit refineries and fuel depots deep inside Russian territory. Reuters reported that about 17% of Russia's oil-refining capacity had been at least temporarily taken out of operation. Some unconfirmed estimates put the figure higher, suggesting up to 40% has been affected at some point, with roughly 20% down at any one time.5,2
Targets have included the Ryazan plant, one of Russia's biggest fuel-processing facilities, 200km from Moscow, which can normally produce 340,000 barrels a day. About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which can reach targets 1,500km inside Russia and have sophisticated navigation.2
The domestic squeeze is severe. As of the end of June, about 90% of Russia's regions had reported fuel rationing or some form of supply disruption, according to statements from local authorities and media reports. Moscow has responded by seeking imports from its neighbours, including a request to Kazakhstan for 50,000 tons of gasoline that Astana has been slow to accept, apparently worried about consequences for its own export commitments.4,3
The knock-on effects are spreading. Kyrgyzstan said in the week of June 29 that it had appealed to Russia for help, only to receive a commitment for roughly half the volume it needs. In late July, Russia agreed to deliver about 100,000 tons of petroleum products a month to Kyrgyzstan for the rest of the year, far short of what the country had requested.4,6
Uzbekistan is feeling the pressure through prices. AI-92, a widely used gasoline grade, climbed 11.8% since the beginning of June to 13.9 million soums ($1,163) a ton on the commodity exchange, local media outlet Spot.uz reported on Wednesday (2026-07-01), citing exchange data. Daily gasoline supply on the exchange fell by about 50% on June 1 compared with the preceding week.4
Russia's grip on the region runs deeper than fuel trade, which makes the diversification push harder to sustain. Russia rivals only China as Central Asia's main trading partner, and 95% of Kazakhstan's oil exports pass through Russian territory. Moscow is also set to build Kazakhstan's first atomic power plant. Fuel shortages are giving Central Asian governments reason to reconsider dependence, but the structural ties are not easy to cut.1
Kyrgyzstan is trying to shorten the odds. The government is accelerating a project to build a domestic refinery capable of producing about 450,000 tons of petroleum products per year, enough to meet nearly a quarter of the country's annual demand. Yet the economics of doing so sit awkwardly alongside the country's financial reliance on Moscow: remittances account for around a fifth of Kyrgyzstan's GDP, and last year 93% of them, around $2.8 billion, came from Russia. Bishkek has every incentive to keep relations stable even as it shops for new fuel sources.6,1
For Moscow, the capacity losses carry a cost beyond the domestic pump price. Fuel exports to Central Asia have served as a tool of influence, keeping the region's governments aligned with Kremlin interests. Every ton Tajikistan buys from Turkmenistan or a future Kyrgyz refinery represents a marginal erosion of that leverage. The process is slow. But Tajikistan's July import shift and Kyrgyzstan's refinery push suggest it is already running.6
ICE Brent crude front-month stood at $93.70 a barrel as of 2026-08-21, while Urals crude was at $88.85 on the same date. The $4.85 spread reflects the market's ongoing discount for Russian barrels, a discount that widens whenever refinery outages compound export uncertainty. [LIVE PRICES]
The pace of Ukraine's drone campaign points to continued pressure on Russian refining. Whether Central Asian states can convert short-term supply scrambles into durable alternative arrangements depends partly on how fast Kyrgyzstan's refinery project advances and partly on whether China, which already rivals Russia as the region's dominant trading partner, moves to fill the supply gap that Moscow is leaving behind.1,6