Trump's Hormuz Toll Reversed Inside 24 Hours, Leaving Bab al-Mandab Outside the Iran Deal
Washington abandoned a $240 million-a-day Hormuz levy under Gulf pressure while the Bab al-Mandab, carrying 12% of global oil, remains unaddressed by the June agreement.
The 20% toll Trump proposed on tankers using the Strait of Hormuz lasted less than a day. Within 24 hours of announcing it on July 14 (2026-07-14), the White House reversed course under pressure from Gulf leaders who refused to accept a levy on shipping that carried their own hydrocarbons. The administration described the reversal as the result of "highly productive conversations with Middle East leadership."6
Reuters data put the foregone revenue at roughly $240 million a day. The speed of that retreat — and the size of the figure abandoned — illustrated how thin Washington's residual leverage had become after months of fighting a war it has struggled to exit cleanly. ICE Brent crude front-month was priced at $104.32 per barrel and NYMEX WTI front-month at $99.99 per barrel as of September 13 (2026-09-13), both still elevated from the supply disruption that preceded the deal.6
Iran had shut roughly 15% of global oil supply when it closed Hormuz, while simultaneously cutting off Qatar's LNG exports, which account for around 20% of global LNG trade, according to reporting from May 2026 (2026-05-19).2 JKM Asian LNG front-month closed September 13 (2026-09-13) at $24.88 per MMBtu, reflecting tightness in Asian markets that has persisted since Qatari cargoes were disrupted.
A memorandum signed June 17 (2026-06-17) by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian formally ended the military phase of the conflict, according to War on the Rocks. But a June 25 (2026-06-25) assessment by the same outlet — headlined "Open Strait, Unsettled Waters" — placed the deal's durability in doubt before the ink was dry.5
The Bab al-Mandab adds a separate pressure point. Around 12% of global oil transits that strait, and Houthis threatened to close it in May 2026 (2026-05-23), operating independently of the Tehran-Washington negotiating channel.3 The June 17 memorandum contained no mechanism to constrain Houthi action at the Bab al-Mandab. Washington's military options in Yemen are narrower than those it deployed against Iran directly.
By August 3 (2026-08-03), Oilprice.com was invoking the monkey trap to describe Washington's strategic position — a device that holds anything unwilling to release what it has grasped. The analysis argued the U.S. had accumulated enough investment in the Iran conflict to make withdrawal painful, without securing gains sufficient to justify continuing.7
The domestic inflation consequences of that investment were already visible. U.S. headline CPI rose to 3.8% and PPI to 6% as the Hormuz closure drove gasoline prices higher, per reporting from May 23 (2026-05-23).3 RBOB gasoline front-month was priced at $3.31 per gallon as of September 13 (2026-09-13).
Singapore introduced a nearly $800 million support package for households and businesses in June 2026 (2026-06-05) to absorb higher energy costs — a measure of how quickly Gulf supply disruptions feed through to Asian consumers reliant on spot LNG cargoes.4
Operation Epic Fury was launched with a two-week ceasefire declared on April 7 (2026-04-07) and ran for close to the duration of Desert Storm, according to The Economist. Desert Storm ended with Bush's domestic approval rating near 90%. The Iran engagement produced no comparable political clarity.1
The toll reversal on July 14 (2026-07-14) confirmed that Gulf states would not permit Washington to monetise a strait even partially reopened through U.S. military action. Commercial shipping — including Gulf crude — was not going to serve as a revenue base.6
The Hormuz memorandum left the Bab al-Mandab unaddressed. If the Houthis act independently on their closure threat — outside any Iran deal framework — ICE Brent crude front-month, at $104.32 per barrel as of September 13 (2026-09-13), has a clear path higher.3,5