Mitsui Hunts LNG Equity Across Three Regions to Supply Data Centre Power
Mitsui targets Middle East, US and Australian LNG assets as AI power demand meets a market split between Russian supply and China's pipeline ambitions.
Mitsui & Co. is seeking equity stakes or offtake agreements in liquefied natural gas projects across the Middle East, the United States and Australia, its chief executive said on May 31 (2026-05-31), citing AI-driven power demand as the driver for locking in long-duration gas supply. The Japanese commodities major framed the search explicitly around the growing electricity requirements of the data centre industry.5,4
The move comes as global LNG supply routes are being pulled simultaneously toward Europe, still absorbing large volumes of Russian gas, and toward Asia, where China is negotiating a pipeline deal that could reduce its reliance on seaborne imports. Both dynamics complicate projections that new LNG equity stakes in the regions Mitsui is targeting will generate the stable returns the company appears to be seeking.5,2
EU member states paid Russia EUR 2.9bn for around 5.1 million tonnes, equivalent to 6.9 billion cubic metres, of LNG in the first quarter of 2026, up from 4.3 million tonnes in the same period a year earlier, environmental group Urgewald reported on May 15 (2026-05-15), as cited by Montel. The increase came despite the bloc's formal policy of phasing out Russian energy imports.1
The geographic concentration of those shipments makes the political problem harder to resolve. Urgewald's data showed 97% of all Yamal Arctic LNG deliveries in the first quarter of 2026 went to European buyers, establishing the EU as the dominant market for Russia's flagship Atlantic-basin export terminal — and with no ban in place, the volumes and revenues keep flowing.1
European buyers have not been filling that gap with American supply. Despite the formal phase-out commitment and supply concerns elsewhere, buyers across the continent have avoided signing long-term LNG purchase agreements with US exporters, according to OilPrice.com reporting from June 12 (2026-06-12). US developers need anchor contracts to reach final investment decisions on new export facilities; the hesitancy from European offtakers slows new capacity.6
The Russia-China pipeline track could reshape the other side of the equation. Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation signed a legally binding memorandum to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and expand capacity on the existing Power of Siberia 1 route, according to Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. PoS-2 would run 2,600 kilometres from Russia's Yamal Peninsula to northern China via eastern Mongolia, designed to carry up to 50 billion cubic metres per year.3,2
The scale of that pipeline's potential impact on LNG markets is significant. China imported 79 million metric tonnes of LNG, around 107 bcm, plus 71 bcm of pipeline gas in 2024, according to CSIS data. If PoS-2 reaches its stated capacity, China could be importing over 100 bcm of Russian gas after 2030, covering more than one-fifth of projected 2030 demand, per CSIS analysis. That displaced demand would come from the same regions where Mitsui is now hunting equity.2
The Power of Siberia 1 experience suggests the timeline could stretch considerably. China concluded that $400 billion deal in May 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, and PoS-1 took years after signing to reach its target annual flow of 38 bcm. Price negotiations were the primary obstacle across nearly a decade of talks; CSIS analysts note Beijing retains substantial leverage in PoS-2 discussions given Russia's limited alternative buyers for Siberian gas exports.2,3
ICE Endex TTF front-month settled at EUR 71.95 per megawatt-hour at Saturday's (2026-09-05) European close; Asian LNG front-month JKM closed at $24.02 per MMBtu on Saturday (2026-09-05). For Mitsui, contracting supply to data centre operators is intended to insulate LNG investments from commodity price swings, pairing long-duration supply with long-duration demand. But if PoS-2 price negotiations proceed faster than PoS-1 did, and Russia's stronger post-2022 incentive to redirect gas east gives Beijing less reason to concede on price, the Chinese import volumes underpinning investment cases in Australia and the Middle East start to look thinner than current demand forecasts suggest.2,35