LNG Tankers Stay Away From Hormuz as Oil Ships Return
Oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is recovering, but LNG carriers are not following — and the gap is widening.
Oil tankers are moving through the Strait of Hormuz again. LNG carriers are not. That divergence, reported by market participants to Montel on Friday (2026-09-04), captures the fragile and uneven nature of the waterway's partial reopening after months of conflict-driven disruption.8
Just six LNG tanker crossings have been recorded at the strait since hostilities escalated, according to Montel's reporting, while crude and product tankers have pushed volumes higher. Market participants cited two factors driving the gap: the significantly higher asset values of LNG vessels compared to crude tankers, and differences in how LNG cargoes are contracted that make unplanned route deviations far more complicated to absorb.8
ADNOC, the Abu Dhabi state producer, has continued loading LNG at its Persian Gulf terminal throughout the disruption, according to satellite imaging data cited by Bloomberg and reported by Rigzone on Friday (2026-09-04). The images showed at least one tanker docked and taking on cargo. ADNOC has kept operations running even as hostilities between the US and Iran escalated around it.6,7
But loading and sailing are two different things. The satellite data shows production continuing; it does not show the LNG moving freely through Hormuz. ADNOC's shipping arm had an empty LNG carrier in the region as of late July (2026-07-29), Rigzone reported, suggesting the company was managing logistics carefully rather than sending loaded vessels through the chokepoint.4
The underlying legal risk is substantial. Iran announced in late August (2026-08-24) a threat to fine or confiscate 46 vessels it deemed to have made unauthorised crossings of the strait, analysts told Montel. That threat directly reduces the incentive for shipowners to test the route, regardless of what oil tankers ahead of them have managed. An LNG carrier worth several hundred million dollars represents a categorically different risk calculation from a crude tanker.5
Iran's list of 46 targeted vessels introduces a specific deterrent that crude tanker owners may be more willing to absorb than LNG operators. For the LNG market, the threat of asset confiscation is an existential event for the shipowner and charterer involved. That asymmetry explains much of the behavioural gap Montel's sources described.5
The problem runs deeper still. Unlike crude, LNG cannot be rerouted through an alternative pipeline when a sea lane closes. A gas analyst told Montel on Thursday (2026-05-21) that LNG's reputation for supply flexibility was being directly tested by the Hormuz situation, because for Gulf LNG there are simply no alternative routes. Pipeline substitution is not available in the way it might be for oil.2
That has kept supply tight for buyers dependent on Gulf LNG, principally in Asia. JKM, the Asian LNG benchmark, stood at $24.02/MMBtu at Friday's (2026-09-05) close. Dubai crude settled at $98.72/bbl over the same period, above ICE Brent front-month at $94.97/bbl, a spread reflecting Gulf risk priced into regional crude benchmarks.8,6
Dark transits — voyages conducted without vessel tracking signals — accounted for 57% of all Hormuz crossings recorded over the conflict period, peaking at 65.2% in May, according to data reported by OilPrice.com in June (2026-06-09). That figure covers all vessel types and underlines that whatever traffic is moving through the strait is doing so in ways that obscure exposure rather than eliminate it. LNG operators, whose vessels are easily identified and tracked by satellite, have less ability to conduct a genuinely dark transit than a smaller crude tanker.3
Qatar managed five LNG cargo clearances through the strait from the start of the conflict through early June (2026-06-09), Reuters reported, citing tracking data. Five cargoes over several months from one of the world's largest LNG exporters illustrates the scale of disruption. Qatar's volumes through Hormuz in a normal month are a multiple of that.3
The UAE was direct about the wider implications as early as May. ADNOC's chief executive called Iran's grip on Hormuz passage a dangerous precedent on Thursday (2026-05-21), according to Montel, even as a two-week US-Iran ceasefire was nominally in effect at the time. The ceasefire did not translate into freedom of navigation for LNG carriers then, and the pattern has not changed materially since.1
The next concrete signal will come if any named vessel from Iran's list of 46 attempts a Hormuz crossing in the coming weeks — and how Iran responds if one does. Until that test occurs, LNG shipowners have every reason to keep their vessels elsewhere.5