Hormuz Throughput Down Over 90% as Alternative Routes Strain Under Three Months of Conflict

Hormuz Throughput Down Over 90% as Alternative Routes Strain Under Three Months of Conflict Saudi Arabia and the UAE are rushing crude through bypass pipelines, but combined capacity falls well short of pre-conflict Hormuz volumes. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz have collapsed by more than 90% since the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran began in late February (2026-02-), removing what industry estimates put at nearly 1 billion barrels of crude from global supply over roughly three months, according to figures cited by Saudi Aramco's leadership. The strait, a 21-mile-wide chokepoint between Iran and Oman, carried an average of 21 million barrels per day in 2022, equivalent to about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption, EIA data show.^4,3 That scale of disruption has no modern precedent. Every week the passage stays closed removes an estimated 100 million barrels from global supply, according to industry calculations, and IEA member states have already drawn on coordinated emergency stocks to buffer the shock, releasing 400 million barrels — IEA executive director Fatih Birol described that figure as just 20% of available reserves.^1,3 Saudi Arabia has responded by routing crude through the East-West pipeline, which runs from its eastern oilfields to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu. The line's baseline capacity is 5 million barrels per day, and Saudi Aramco temporarily stretched it to 7 million b/d in 2019 by converting natural gas liquids pipelines to carry crude. Aramco is now targeting exports of more than 5 million b/d through alternative routes to help stabilize supply.^4,3 The UAE has taken a parallel approach, redirecting flows through the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to the Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing the Strait entirely. That existing pipe carries a maximum of 1.5 million b/d, according to EIA figures. Combined, the Saudi and UAE alternative corridors can move roughly 6.5 million b/d at full stretch — less than a third of pre-conflict Hormuz volumes.^4,2 The gap is not theoretical. Three commercial supertankers carrying a combined 6 million barrels departed the strait on Wednesday (2026-05-20) after being stranded inside the Persian Gulf for more than two months, Reuters reported. Their passage generated brief optimism, but the episode also illustrated the fragility of any resumption: individual transits remain contingent on day-to-day security conditions rather than a settled reopening.⁶ ADNOC's chief executive Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber announced on Wednesday (2026-05-20) that the UAE is 50% through construction of a second Fujairah bypass pipeline, with delivery scheduled for next year. "Energy security is no longer just about your ability to continue producing energy," Al Jaber said, in remarks that underscored how Gulf producers are now treating permanent bypass infrastructure as a strategic imperative rather than a contingency.^2,5 Even with that project complete, the arithmetic remains uncomfortable. The EIA noted that Hormuz crude, condensate, and product flows rose by 2.4 million b/d between 2020 and 2022 as post-pandemic demand recovered, reaching 21 million b/d — a ceiling that existing and near-term bypass capacity cannot approach. The shortfall is structural for as long as the closure holds.⁴ Oil prices have moved in conflicting directions against this backdrop. The consensus across thirteen signals tracked by EnergyReader is bearish, weighted at roughly 77%, driven largely by IEA stock releases and hopes of U.S.-Iran peace talks reported by the BBC on Wednesday (2026-05-21). Yet a contrarian bullish signal remains on ICE Brent crude front-month with moderate confidence, grounded in demand considerations — a reflection that any diplomatic progress can reverse quickly if talks stall.^1,7 The IEA's Birol was explicit that the 400-million-barrel release is not the agency's ceiling. "We have still 80% in our pocket," he told reporters, signaling further coordinated action is available but preserving optionality. That posture keeps a lid on near-term price spikes while doing nothing to resolve the physical supply gap if the strait stays closed.¹ What traders are watching now is whether the Yanbu and Fujairah terminals can absorb the sustained volume Aramco is promising without degrading loading rates or creating tanker congestion at the terminals themselves — neither source material nor official statements address that operational constraint directly. The second UAE pipeline arriving in 2027 extends the bypass runway, but next year is not this quarter.^2,5