China's solar exports to the Global South outpace the North for the first time
Chinese solar shipments to developing markets rose 32% to 126 GW in 2024, topping the 116 GW sent to wealthier economies, reshaping trade and tariff politics.
China's solar exports to the Global South exceeded shipments to the developed world for the first time in 2024, a shift that is redrawing the economic geography of the energy transition and forcing tariff responses from importing governments. Developing markets absorbed 126 GW of Chinese solar hardware last year, up 32%, while exports to the Global North fell 6% to 116 GW, according to data reported by The Economist.1
Developing countries, not Europe or North America, are now the marginal buyers of Chinese solar hardware, and they are absorbing it at a pace that is straining their grids and prompting defensive trade measures. South Africa imposed tariffs of 10% on Chinese solar panels last year after grappling with grid stability problems, and Brazil — among the top three importers of modules — raised its tariffs to 25% in November.1
The shift is visible across the project pipeline. Bangladesh's Power Development Board issued tenders for 495 MW of grid-tied solar in April. In the Philippines, TotalEnergies and Nextnorth reached financial close on a 440 MW solar project. Indian regulators adopted tariffs for 2,000 MW of solar capacity. Yet China and India together approved 88 GW of new coal capacity in 2025, the most in nearly a decade, a reminder that the build-out of solar is not displacing fossil fuels fast enough to matter to dispatch-level planning.3
The economics driving this are direct. Utility-scale renewable projects now produce electricity more cheaply than the cheapest new fossil fuel alternative, and battery storage costs have fallen 93% since 2010, allowing grids to store solar and wind output during periods of low generation, according to Foreign Policy reporting.3
Chinese green-tech companies have promised to invest $200 billion in other countries since 2022, according to a September study by researchers at Johns Hopkins. That capital is flowing into manufacturing and project development across the Global South, deepening supply chain ties that exports alone cannot capture. Pakistan is a case in point: its government is encouraging Chinese investment in local manufacturing of panels, batteries, and other green technology even as it tries to stabilize its own power market.1
The urgency is not purely commercial. At an Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit on May 7 (2026-05-07), Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto told fellow leaders that energy dependence amid Middle East volatility was "no longer a long-term problem, but an urgent one." Indonesia alone budgeted roughly $12.3 billion for energy subsidies in 2026 before the war threatened to drive costs higher.3
The conflict with Iran appears to be accelerating this shift. Domestically generated electricity from renewable sources is insulated from conflicts that disrupt global oil and gas supplies. Once renewable infrastructure is installed, there is no fuel to import and no geopolitical chokepoint through which energy supplies must pass.5
The aggregate numbers support the trend. The International Energy Agency's World Energy Investment 2026, published in May, projects that of the $3.4 trillion the world will spend on energy investments this year, $2.2 trillion will go to clean energy — nearly double the amount going to fossil fuels, despite political headwinds against decarbonization.4
Solar is set to become the world's largest source of electricity by 2032, supported by lower costs, technology improvements, and surplus manufacturing capacity, with battery storage capacity expected to reach 3.8 TW by 2035, according to Asian Power reporting on industry forecasts.2
The tariff responses from South Africa and Brazil suggest the easy phase of this trade is over. Both countries are struggling with grid stability after sudden influxes of Chinese panels, and both chose protection over open markets. India alone is expected to add 350 GW of solar capacity between 2024 and 2030, which means the scale of absorption will only grow — and with it, the pressure on importing governments to decide whether duties protect local industries or simply inflate project costs.1
Whether more importers follow South Africa and Brazil's approach, and whether Chinese suppliers respond by shifting volumes to markets that keep their doors open, will shape the next phase of this trade.1