Hungary's Paks Plant Restarts as Magyar Presses Russia on 2.4 GW Expansion
Budapest's recovery from a near-shutdown of its only nuclear plant sharpens PM Peter Magyar's negotiating position with Moscow over the Russian-backed Paks II project.
Hungary's Paks nuclear plant brought one turbine back online on Monday evening (2026-08-10) after low Danube water levels had forced prolonged curtailment, Prime Minister Peter Magyar said. The restart ended weeks of acute supply pressure on a grid that had resorted to voluntary rationing before cooler temperatures and rainfall arrived.5
Three days earlier, on Friday (2026-08-07), Magyar had warned that a complete Paks shutdown remained possible if the river failed to recover. Budapest formally ended its voluntary rationing programme as conditions improved. The episode exposed how little cushion Hungary has when its sole nuclear facility goes offline.4
The operational recovery feeds into a larger political test. Magyar, whose Tisza party ended Viktor Orbán's 16-year rule in a landslide election on Sunday (2026-05-17), inherited not only a drought-sensitive grid but also the 2.4 GW Paks II expansion — a project approved under Orbán with Russian state involvement. Analysts told Montel that Magyar's victory was expected to push Hungary closer to the EU while reducing dependence on Russian energy.1
The Paks II construction is where that realignment gets specific. The expansion would more than double Hungary's existing nuclear capacity, but its construction depends on Russian state entities. Any move to renegotiate or slow the project carries grid consequences that the August drought crisis made plain: with the existing plant at risk of full shutdown, Hungary's margin for manoeuvre is narrower than its political direction suggests.1,5
Russian pipeline gas sits in the same equation. The Turkish Stream pipeline's second strand was designed to carry 15.75 billion cubic metres of gas annually into Europe, with Hungary and the Austrian hub at Baumgarten among the principal recipients, according to DW. That architecture was built under Orbán and runs through the bilateral relationship Magyar is now seeking to reshape.2
ICE Endex TTF front-month gas was priced at €60.29/MWh at 0815 UTC on Friday (2026-08-14), reflecting ample storage heading into autumn. But the wider European supply picture offers Budapest limited leverage. The EU imported a record 9.97 million metric tonnes of Russian LNG from the Yamal facility in the first half of 2026, up 16% year-on-year and worth approximately $6.82 billion, according to Kpler data. European buyers absorbed more than 97% of the facility's total output during the period.3
Pipeline flows moved in the same direction. EU imports of Russian pipeline gas rose 7% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, while Russian LNG into Europe climbed 11%, OilPrice.com reported. Both figures press against the EU's plan to ban Russian LNG imports from 2027, a deadline that leaves Central European countries limited time to arrange replacement supply.3
Orbán built Hungary's energy policy around low Russian prices and preferential bilateral terms. Magyar's government has signalled the reverse direction. Still, a government that watched Paks nearly go dark in August is unlikely to accelerate a rupture with Russia before alternative supply and capacity arrangements are in place.1
Budapest's next concrete signal is whether it issues a formal review of the Paks II construction timeline before winter. That move, more than any political statement, will indicate how far Hungary's energy realignment can go — and at what cost to the grid security the August drought crisis so plainly exposed.1,5