Saudi Aramco Reroutes Crude Around Africa as Bab el-Mandeb Shuts Down
EIA data confirm 9.4 million barrels per day now rounding the Cape of Good Hope, exposing Riyadh to steep freight costs it is absorbing to protect market share.
The EIA's August Short-Term Energy Outlook, published on August 11 (2026-08-11) and based on Vortexa tanker tracking data, put Cape of Good Hope daily oil transit volumes at 9.4 million barrels per day in the second quarter — a figure that captures the scale of rerouting forced on producers once the Red Sea effectively closed. The Strait of Hormuz, where production shut-ins averaged 5.5 million barrels per day in July according to the same STEO, remains severely restricted. The EIA said it assumed Hormuz shipments will remain "severely limited" for its forecast horizon.8
ICE Brent crude front-month was trading at $88.88 per barrel as of 07:02 UTC on August 13 (2026-08-13), down sharply from the nearly $98 per barrel it touched when shipping disruptions first forced the rerouting debate into the open. That peak represented a gain of more than 33% in a single month, according to reporting at the time. A brief US-Iran pause on July 27 (2026-07-27) knocked Brent futures $6.20, or 6.4%, to $90.58, with WTI dropping to $83.51. The partial recovery since then reflects lingering supply uncertainty rather than any resolution at the chokepoints.3,5
Saudi Aramco is at the center of the rerouting calculus. The company entered active discussions with at least two Asian refiners about redirecting crude shipments around the Cape of Good Hope rather than through Bab el-Mandeb, according to reporting from late July (2026-07-23). The detour adds roughly $5 per barrel in freight costs. Riyadh is absorbing that penalty rather than losing the buyer.3
The logic behind that decision runs through the East-West pipeline. Saudi Arabia had already shifted 70% to 75% of its crude exports through that pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu as Hormuz disruptions mounted, according to Standard Chartered. Loadings at Yanbu climbed to approximately 4.5 million barrels per day. Combined with southbound crude flows coming through the Suez Canal, roughly 7 million barrels per day were transiting Bab el-Mandeb before the Houthi attacks escalated.4
The strait's closure would pull another 12% of global oil trade off the market, according to analysis cited by Energy Voice, and would deal serious damage to the Saudi economy in the process. A MarineTraffic analyst described the "Bab el-Mandeb risk picture" as deteriorating on July 22 (2026-07-22), after Houthi rebels announced they would seek to impose a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia — a significant escalation beyond their earlier targeting of international shipping.1,6
Standard Chartered noted that the disruption extends beyond Saudi exports. The Red Sea, together with the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline, forms a combined transit corridor that was moving around 7 million barrels per day before the conflict widened. The SUMED pipeline itself can handle approximately 2.5 million barrels per day at full capacity, offering a partial bypass for crude that has already entered the Red Sea.2
Riyadh's willingness to pay the Cape detour premium reflects a calculation about revenue stability during a period when the kingdom is actively diversifying its fiscal base. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 annual report showed that non-oil activities accounted for 55% of real GDP in 2025, with non-oil government revenue rising substantially since 2016. But the kingdom still depends on crude export volumes to fund the remainder of that transition, which makes protecting Asian buyer relationships a near-term priority even at elevated freight cost.7
Russia's position adds a complicating variable. RBC analysis assessed that around 58% of Russian refinery capacity — approximately 4.3 million barrels per day — has been damaged in some form, tightening the global supply picture further. Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining infrastructure have reduced one of the alternative supply sources that Asian buyers might otherwise have leaned on. With Hormuz constrained, Bab el-Mandeb threatened, and Russian output disrupted simultaneously, the Cape of Good Hope route is carrying load that would normally be spread across three separate corridors.6
The EIA's second-quarter chokepoint data underscores just how much weight that route is now bearing. The Strait of Malacca led all chokepoints at 16.6 million barrels per day, the Cape of Good Hope logged 9.4 million, Bab el-Mandeb recorded 8.1 million, and the Suez Canal 5.8 million — with the Danish Straits at 4.7 million. Those are second-quarter figures; the trajectory since July, as Houthi attacks intensified and the Saudi rerouting expanded, likely pushed Cape volumes higher still.8
For oil traders, the number that matters now is whether Aramco's Cape routing agreements extend to additional refiners beyond the two already in discussions, and at what freight rate threshold those deals begin to unravel if Brent slides further from its July peak.