Kazakhstan Seeks Caucasus Export Routes as Drone Strikes Keep Novorossiysk Risk Alive
Astana is evaluating pipelines through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey after a week-long CPC shutdown cut Kazakh output by more than half.
Kazakhstan is looking to re-route part of its crude oil exports onto pipelines through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, Oilprice.com reported on Monday (2026-08-10), as continued drone strikes on tankers at Novorossiysk have turned the Black Sea terminal from an intermittent problem into a structural one.3
ICE Brent crude front-month was trading at $89.48 a barrel as of 2026-08-12, holding gains as traders priced in simultaneous supply risks from both Black Sea and Middle East shipping lanes.3
The exposure behind Astana's search is straightforward. The CPC pipeline runs 1,500 kilometers from Kazakhstan's Tengiz oilfield across southern Russia to Novorossiysk and carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports.1 No comparable alternative is in place.
What that dependence looks like in practice became clear last month. The CPC stopped accepting oil from producers around July 20 (2026-07-20) after drone attacks on tankers at the Black Sea terminal forced a suspension of loadings. Industry data cited by Reuters showed Kazakhstan's oil and gas condensate output had fallen to 133,200 metric tons, or about 1 million barrels per day, by July 26 (2026-07-26) — less than half the 2.16 million bpd the country averaged in June. The consortium restarted on July 27 (2026-07-27) after roughly a week offline.1,2,3
More than 1 million bpd lost for seven days gives traders a baseline for what a longer stoppage costs. The July disruption arrived alongside already-strained Middle East shipping routes, compressing the buffer against further shocks.3
The political geometry of CPC ownership limits how fast Astana can act. The Russian Federation holds a 24% stake, the single largest in the consortium, while affiliates of Chevron and ExxonMobil hold minority positions.3 Moscow's financial interest in CPC revenues provides some incentive for operational continuity, but has not prevented stoppages when tanker attacks have forced the terminal dark.
The corridor Kazakhstan is evaluating would direct crude through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, moving oil west across the South Caucasus to Turkey's port of Ceyhan rather than north through Russian territory. How much volume could actually shift depends on connecting infrastructure between western Kazakhstan and the pipeline's intake point — a constraint that does not resolve quickly.3
Each disruption so far has ended within days. But the frequency is what is changing Astana's calculus. Novorossiysk has halted throughput enough times that diversification has shifted from contingency planning to an active priority. Given that CPC carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports, any extended outage removes the bulk of output from a country that averaged 2.16 million bpd in June.1,3
The proximate risk for crude markets is another drone strike on Novorossiysk before Kazakhstan secures additional export capacity. A renewed week-long shutdown, arriving without viable re-routing in place, would add fresh upward pressure to an ICE Brent contract already holding above $89 a barrel as of 2026-08-12.3,1