Saudi Arabia Routes Supertankers to Egypt as Houthi Threat Empties Yanbu
Eight VLCCs heading to Egypt's Sidi Kerir terminal signal a Saudi routing shift as SUMED's 2.5 million b/d ceiling falls short of pre-disruption Red Sea volumes.
At least eight empty supertankers were tracked heading to Egypt's Mediterranean terminal at Sidi Kerir on Monday (2026-07-28), bound to collect Saudi crude routed through the SUMED pipeline rather than risk the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Observable tanker traffic at Yanbu, the kingdom's key Red Sea export hub, had fallen to a multi-month low.6,7
The shift is abrupt. Saudi Arabia had been moving crude out of Yanbu at a record pace, with tanker tracking data showing 5.9 million barrels a day leaving the kingdom's two Red Sea terminals in the week ending July 17 (2026-07-17). Houthi militants have since threatened a maritime blockade on Saudi shipping, and Riyadh has responded by redirecting flows northward through Egyptian infrastructure.2,3
SUMED runs from Ain Sokhna on Egypt's Red Sea coast to Sidi Kerir on the Mediterranean, allowing Saudi crude to bypass Bab el-Mandeb entirely. But the pipeline has a ceiling. Stated capacity sits at around 2.5 million barrels per day at full utilization, well short of the volumes the kingdom had been pushing through Yanbu at the peak.4
Crude that cannot fit through SUMED and cannot safely transit the strait faces a binary set of options: wait for conditions to improve, or take the much longer voyage around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Two Asian refiners were in active discussions with Saudi Aramco as of July 23 (2026-07-23) about Cape routing, according to reports, a signal that major buyers are treating the disruption as something other than short-lived. At least one tanker carrying Saudi crude to Asia had already diverted through the Suez Canal rather than risk Bab el-Mandeb, according to a report published Sunday (2026-07-27).4,5
Bab el-Mandeb is a narrow chokepoint between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula that normally channels an estimated 12% of global trade by volume and roughly 30% of global container traffic. A MarineTraffic analyst said on Wednesday (2026-07-22) that the "Bab el-Mandeb risk picture is deteriorating." Traffic data from the following week bore that out.1,3
The Houthi threat has not remained confined to that strait. Visible traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had also sunk sharply by late July (2026-07-22), with at least one Red Sea vessel recording unusual evasive maneuvers, according to tracking data. Calling the Sidi Kerir rerouting a contained, temporary fix looks harder with both straits under pressure simultaneously.2
ICE Brent crude front-month was trading at $87.10 per barrel on Wednesday (2026-07-29), down slightly on the session. Reports as of July 23 (2026-07-23) had placed Brent above $98 per barrel, citing the shipping disruption as the catalyst for a rally of more than 33% over the prior month. The subsequent retreat suggests the market has credited the SUMED workaround with some supply relief — but the pipeline cannot absorb Saudi Arabia's full pre-disruption volumes.4
Egypt's position is not straightforward. Sidi Kerir and SUMED have become central nodes in the Saudi workaround, generating transit revenue. Yet Suez Canal toll income is a significant pillar of Egyptian government finances at a time of acute fiscal strain, and crude routed through SUMED rather than through the canal does nothing for that revenue line.1
The near-term signal for crude markets is whether demand for SUMED throughput outstrips the pipeline's 2.5 million barrel per day ceiling as more Saudi volume seeks the Mediterranean route. If it does, additional crude will have to go around the Cape, adding weeks of transit and freight costs that feed into delivered prices for Asian buyers. How quickly Aramco and its Asian customers finalise Cape routing terms, and what discount those buyers extract, will be a sharper measure of actual supply displacement than the supertanker headcount at Sidi Kerir.4,2