IEA Puts $35 Billion Value on Latin America's Minerals Push as China Controls Loom
Latin America could capture that value by 2035 through domestic refining, even as Beijing's export curbs keep $6.5 trillion in global downstream output at risk.
The International Energy Agency estimates Latin America could capture an extra $35 billion in economic value by 2035 if the region developed domestic refining capacity across lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, rare earths, and roughly two-thirds of its copper production — an assessment the agency published Friday (2026-07-24) as it mapped the region's strategic position in the global critical minerals contest.5
China's export restrictions give those numbers urgency. The IEA warned on Thursday (2026-07-16) that Beijing's curbs on rare earth elements could put an estimated $6.5 trillion per year of downstream production outside China at risk, covering sectors from automotive to defence electronics. Full disruption of battery-grade graphite trade alone would threaten more than $300 billion in annual output outside China. Beijing has suspended further expansion of those controls until November 2026, but the pause is not a withdrawal.4
The IEA's broader assessment is that the region holds the reserves to play a meaningful role in diversifying global supply chains away from Chinese concentration. But the gap between minerals in the ground and refined products on world markets is substantial. Building out lithium carbonate processing, copper smelting, and rare earth separation requires financing and engineering capacity that most Latin American governments have not yet assembled.5
The electric vehicle market defines the demand side of this equation. The IEA projected on Wednesday (2026-05-20) that EVs would account for nearly 30% of global car sales this year, with around 23 million units sold worldwide — up from roughly 20 million in 2025, when global EV sales grew 20%. Chinese automakers supplied approximately 60% of electric cars sold globally in 2025; European and North American manufacturers each held around 15% of sales.1 China's weight in finished vehicles mirrors its control over the upstream materials those vehicles require.4
Global EV sales fell 8% in the first quarter of 2026, following policy shifts in China and the United States. But the IEA still expects the annual total to hold near 23 million, with demand rising across multiple regions.1
The competition for Latin American mineral resources has a geopolitical dimension that economics alone do not capture. Beijing has coordinated financing, diplomatic engagement, industrial policy, and corporate investment around long-term strategic objectives across the Western Hemisphere, according to a Foreign Policy analysis published on June 8 (2026-06-08). Washington is pushing back, but Latin American governments have shown more interest in concrete terms — infrastructure deals, technology transfer, guaranteed offtake — than in alignment arguments from Washington.3
Nicaragua's consolidation of authoritarian rule, the focus of a Foreign Policy article published Friday (2026-07-24), illustrates the governance dimension of this contest. As democratic institutions weaken across parts of the region, the conditions that Western-aligned financing bodies typically attach to infrastructure and resource deals become harder to impose. Marco Rubio has been making the case for US engagement directly to Latin American leaders, the Economist reported in May (2026-05-17), but China's established presence in regional financing and infrastructure has proved durable.5,32
Brazil, the largest economy in Latin America, carries particular weight in whether the IEA's $35 billion projection moves from estimate to reality. Converting mineral reserves into processed export capacity at scale requires sustained capital commitments that are harder to attract when governance risks are rising across the region.5
The November 2026 deadline for China's suspended export controls is the next concrete test. If Beijing proceeds with expanded restrictions, the $6.5 trillion in downstream exposure the IEA has quantified becomes active risk rather than contingent risk. ICE Brent crude front-month was at $97.81 per barrel as of Friday (2026-07-24); critical minerals supply chains, less visible in daily price screens, carry a degree of source concentration that commodity traders would recognise immediately.4,5