OPEC+ Raises June Output After UAE Departure Leaves Cartel Smaller
Seven OPEC+ members agreed on May 3, 2026 to raise their combined production quota by 188,000 barrels per day in June, days after the United Arab Emirates ended almost 60 years of OPEC membership on May 1. The move came as the alliance scrambled to manage supply without one of its most capable producers — and as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz complicated the backdrop.1
The timing matters. ICE Brent crude front-month traded at $71.94 and WTI at $68.78 as of Friday (2026-07-03), well below the fiscal breakeven levels of most Gulf producers. With the UAE now outside the quota framework and free to target its own production ceiling, the coalition that accounted for 55.9% of global oil output in 2025 faces a straightforward problem: the member with the most spare capacity is gone.1
ADNOC stated at the time of the UAE's exit that its maximum sustainable production capacity was 4.85 million barrels per day, yet its May 2026 quota was just under 3.5 million bpd — a gap of at least 1.35 million bpd, according to Middle East Institute analysis. Average capacity utilisation for the UAE in 2025 was just 66%, against 77% for Saudi Arabia and 84% for Kuwait. The gap had been widening: in 2021, UAE utilisation averaged 73%, but ADNOC has been expanding capacity faster than the quota system would allow it to produce.2
That frustration with the quota structure was one of the main drivers of the exit. Analysts at the Middle East Institute noted that the departure resolves Abu Dhabi's long-running problem of watching its production ceiling set by Riyadh while infrastructure investments languished under-utilised. Outside the cartel, ADNOC can target a utilisation rate closer to its Gulf peers.2
The June quota increase of 188,000 bpd was divided among Algeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Russia and Saudi Arabia, according to the group's statement. The decision came against the backdrop of Strait of Hormuz disruptions — a waterway through which the IEA estimates nearly 20 million barrels per day passed in 2025 — which had already complicated the supply picture before Abu Dhabi's formal departure.1
Kazakhstan illustrated the wider tensions now running through the remaining membership. The country produced 19.7 million tons of oil and gas condensate between January and March (2026-01-01 to 2026-03-31), equivalent to 80.2% of the year-earlier level, with exports of 15.3 million tons over the same period, down 21.5% year-on-year, according to Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov. The ministry forecasts full-year exports of 76 million tons — a target that depends on sustained production discipline from a country that has consistently over-produced against its quota.1
OPEC's own data showed Kazakhstan's crude output rose by 239,000 bpd in 2025 to 1.78 million bpd, a gain that strained relations within the bloc even before the UAE's departure. Global oil production rose by 2.24 million bpd in 2025 to 74.85 million bpd, per OPEC.1
CNBC reported in the week of May 18, 2026 that the UAE was the most influential member of OPEC behind Saudi Arabia and one of the few with genuine spare capacity. Jorge León at Rystad described the departure as a significant break in cartel cohesion. Maurizio Carulli at Quilter Cheviot noted that OPEC's influence on oil prices has varied considerably over the past few decades — and the loss of a member with 1.35 million bpd of headroom narrows the range of market interventions Saudi Arabia can credibly threaten.4,3
Iraq's compliance record is the variable to watch. Baghdad has historically been the alliance's most persistent over-producer, and with the UAE's discipline no longer a counterweight inside the group, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to enforce quotas through its own output sacrifices is greater. Whether Riyadh is willing to absorb that cost — or let the alliance drift toward de facto open production — will determine whether the 188,000 bpd June hike is the start of a managed unwind or a one-off adjustment to a permanently smaller cartel.1