China's $90 Billion Arctic Bet Tests Canada's Grip on Its Own North
Beijing's systematic resource push into Arctic jurisdictions is exposing the cost of Ottawa's contested approach to Inuit governance in Canada's mineral-rich north.
China has committed an estimated $90 billion across Arctic nations including Russia, Iceland, Greenland, Norway, and Finland, and directed more than $2 billion specifically into Greenland mining projects while bidding for control of major airports there.4
A Foreign Policy analysis published Tuesday (2026-09-22) examined whether Inuit communities in Canada, frustrated with Ottawa's governance approach, might eventually seek Chinese capital for Arctic development. Canada's north holds critical mineral deposits that Western supply chains increasingly need, and Beijing has demonstrated it will pay to position itself near them.4
Ottawa's recent devolution of administrative powers to Nunavut and other territorial governments has drawn pointed criticism. Indigenous advocates argue the process transferred authority from one largely non-Indigenous federal structure to another, rather than delivering the self-determination Inuit communities were promised when Nunavut was created in 1999. That gap has persisted for more than two decades.4
Where communities lack meaningful control over their territories, the political legitimacy of resource development deals becomes uncertain regardless of who signs them. China's approach in Greenland — acquiring mining stakes and bidding on infrastructure contracts — did not resolve questions of Indigenous consent in that jurisdiction either. Beijing is not waiting for governance clarity before deploying capital.4
Intelligence analysis has placed China and Russia among the leading Arctic security concerns, with their focus concentrated in northern regions. China maintains a research presence in Norway's Svalbard archipelago. Whether that scientific footprint is a precursor to something more commercial is contested, but the investment figures in Greenland are less ambiguous.1,4
Canada has been moving to expand its own resource trade relationships in parallel. When China widened its export control blacklist targeting Japan on Monday (2026-06-29), adding 20 more entities including units of Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Komatsu, Ottawa read it as an opening. Three days earlier, on Friday (2026-06-26), Canadian and Japanese firms had concluded a trade mission in which they signed more than C$1 billion in commercial agreements. Global Affairs Canada put the week's full total at 14 deals worth over $1.7 billion, a record for a Canadian trade mission.3
The contrast is pointed. Ottawa is actively marketing Canadian resources to Japan partly because China is squeezing Tokyo out of existing supply relationships. But many of the critical mineral deposits Canada is offering access to lie in Arctic territories where Inuit governance disputes remain unresolved.3,4
Prime Minister Carney has used the phrase "Fortress North America" to describe a vision of closer Canadian-American strategic alignment and greater independence from Chinese supply chains. That vision requires the federal government to speak credibly for Canada's northern territories.2
Beijing does not need formal bilateral frameworks to establish resource positions. Its Greenland investments show that equity stakes and infrastructure financing can move ahead of any government-to-government agreement. The same mechanisms are available elsewhere in the Arctic wherever capital is scarce and governance is contested.4
The practical question for commodity traders and project developers is timing. How long before the governance gap in Canada's north becomes wide enough for external capital to fill it, and what form that capital takes. The Nunavut devolution dispute has run since 1999. There is no sign yet that Ottawa is preparing to resolve it quickly.4