Russia Takes 23% of China's Oil Imports as Sechin Claims $27 Billion Savings Since 2022
Rosneft data show Russian crude hitting a four-year import share record in China, with bilateral energy trade up 26% through July 2026.
Russia's share of China's crude oil imports reached a record 23% in the first seven months of 2026, with deliveries totalling 67 million tonnes over that period, according to figures presented by Rosneft chief Igor Sechin at the 8th China-Russia Energy Business Forum in Vladivostok on September 9 (2026-09-09).6
Aggregate trade confirms the same direction. Bilateral turnover climbed 26% in the first seven months of 2026 versus the equivalent period of 2025, with Russian energy resources accounting for more than 60% of Russia's total exports to China. Russia has now been China's largest crude supplier for four consecutive years, with annual deliveries exceeding 100 million tonnes.6
The commercial logic is direct. Sechin estimated China has saved $27 billion since 2022 by purchasing Russian crude rather than Middle Eastern alternatives, a gap that reflects both the Urals discount and the shorter ESPO pipeline route versus tanker freight from the Gulf. Urals crude stood at $106.45 per barrel on September 22 (2026-09-22), above ICE Brent crude front-month at $102.13, though the spread structure in physical markets for China differs from the benchmark relationship visible in European trading.6
Gas flows have deepened the relationship further. By end-2025, Russian gas supplied almost 30% of China's total natural gas imports — 47% of pipeline gas and 14% of LNG imports — according to data presented at the forum. Platts JKM LNG front-month stood at $25.99 per MMBtu on September 22 (2026-09-22), making Russian pipeline gas economically competitive against spot LNG for buyers locked into long-term contracts.6
President Xi Jinping set the political frame on Friday, September 4 (2026-09-04), in a congratulatory letter to the same forum, stating China's readiness to deepen energy cooperation with Russia and keep industrial and supply chains stable. The statement confirmed existing policy rather than signalling a shift, but it offers no indication of any near-term move to diversify away from Russian supply despite sustained Western pressure.5,4
The scale of China's industrial base gives the relationship its weight. Sechin cited figures showing China accounts for roughly 30% of global industrial production, approximately twice the combined share of the United States and the European Union. China also produces 54% of the world's steel and controls 85-90% of rare earth metal processing. Those figures describe an energy demand base large enough to absorb Russian export volumes regardless of what third-party buyers do.6
Russia's pivot to Asia predates the current arrangements but has accelerated sharply. Before its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Asia and Oceania received 52% of Russia's coal exports, 34% of crude and 25% of natural gas, according to EIA data. By 2024, those shares had shifted to 85% of coal, 63% of crude and 30% of natural gas — a compression of Moscow's customer base that makes individual buyers like China and India disproportionately influential over Russian export revenues.2
India's position in that base is itself shifting. India took 34% of Russian crude exports in 2024, up from 30% in 2023, while China's share fell to 26% from 32% over the same period, EIA data show. Indian refiners absorbed more incremental Russian volume last year even as China's headline import-side records continued climbing into 2026 — a divergence that points to competitive dynamics between the two largest buyers of discounted Russian barrels.2
Supply-side disruptions elsewhere have reinforced Asian appetite for Russian alternatives. Gulf supply routes remain under pressure following the Iran conflict, and questions over Hormuz transit have pushed Asian buyers toward non-Gulf sources. Washington's moves on Venezuelan oil are adding further supply-chain uncertainty for importers already running shorter supplier lists, analysts noted.3
Pipeline capacity sets the ceiling on further growth. Russia's ESPO pipeline and the Druzhba system remain the primary physical routes for crude moving into China, and their throughput constraints bound how quickly volumes can expand beyond current levels regardless of commercial incentives. Talks on a second major gas pipeline route have run for years without a final agreement, leaving the gas-side ceiling unresolved.1,2
For traders, the more immediate variable is whether China's industrial output holds at rates consistent with current import volumes. Any contraction in Chinese steel or manufacturing activity would hit crude and LNG demand simultaneously, with knock-on consequences for Platts JKM LNG front-month and Newcastle coal prices. Sechin's $27 billion savings estimate also carries an implicit assumption: if the Urals-versus-Gulf discount narrows as Russian supply finds fewer alternative buyers, the economic case underpinning China's preference for Russian barrels weakens over time.6