Russian Pipeline Gas Surge Pushes Northeast Asia LNG Demand Forecast Down 11 Million Tons
Power of Siberia volumes approaching 40 bcm displace seaborne cargoes, dragging China's 2026 LNG import forecast to its lowest level in years.
China's LNG imports are forecast to drop to 62.4 million tons in 2026 from 66.4 million tons in 2025, with September 2026 arrivals tracking at 4.32 million tons against 5.32 million tons a year earlier — a one-fifth decline in a single month. The driver is pipeline gas.4
Power of Siberia deliveries reached 38.8-38.84 bcm in 2025, are planned to rise to around 40 bcm in 2026, and carry an agreed contractual ceiling of 44 bcm. Adding a transit route through Kazakhstan, total Russian pipeline gas into China in 2026 is expected near 50 bcm, according to analysis published Sunday (2026-09-20) by discoveryalert.com. Each additional bcm of piped supply displaces roughly the equivalent in seaborne capacity, and those displaced cargoes have to go somewhere.4
The ramp has been steep. Gazprom export disclosures show Power of Siberia deliveries at 4 bcm in 2020, climbing to 10.4 bcm in 2021, 15.5 bcm in 2022, 22.7 bcm in 2023, and approximately 31 bcm in 2024. The 38.8 bcm achieved in 2025 puts the pipeline within touching distance of its take-or-pay contract volume of 38 bcm per year, signed by Gazprom and CNPC in May 2014.3
The effect on spot LNG is already visible. Northeast Asia LNG demand is projected at 191 million tons in 2026, down from 202 million tons in 2025.4 March 2026 imports into China dropped to 3.68 million tons, the lowest monthly figure since April 2018.4 When volumes fell that sharply, Beijing reacted by turning China's storage surplus into an arbitrage instrument: in early 2026, China reloaded a record 1.31 million tons of LNG across 19 cargoes, reselling to South Korea, Thailand, Japan, India, and the Philippines.4
Platts JKM LNG front-month was last quoted at $27.51/MMBtu. That level sits well above the threshold where Chinese buyers typically retreat to pipeline and domestic supply, and the discoveryalert.com analysis noted that a price spike toward that range in late Q3 triggered an abrupt demand collapse rather than a slow structural fade. Mid-year, Asia was still importing at a rate roughly 6% above the same month in 2025.4 The price-sensitivity of Chinese buying has effectively become a ceiling on Platts JKM LNG front-month rallies.
The consensus across 32 signals tracked in this market is firmly bearish on Platts JKM LNG front-month, with a bearish weight more than twelve times the bullish weight. But a minority supply-side argument runs in the opposite direction. Power of Siberia 2 — the proposed 2,600-kilometre, 50 bcm-per-year line via Mongolia from Russia's Arctic Yamal fields — remains stalled at a final investment decision, blocked by a pricing standoff between Gazprom and CNPC, unresolved Mongolian transit terms, and Beijing's active diversification toward Qatari long-term LNG and Mozambique's Coral South project.3,2
The May 2026 Putin-Xi summit in Beijing produced what Russia described as a general understanding on Power of Siberia 2, but both sides acknowledged that key details and a timetable still needed to be agreed. China's 15th five-year plan, released in March 2026, referenced only "early-stage" work on the project. That is not a construction schedule.1,2
The bullish case, then, rests on what does not get built. Every year Power of Siberia 2 stays unfinanced is another year the seaborne market retains volume that pipeline gas would otherwise displace. China's pipeline supply from Central Asia already exceeds 40 bcm annually through three routes from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan into Xinjiang.1 The country is not short of alternatives to LNG, and Beijing appears content to let Gazprom absorb the negotiating pressure.
Gazprom's position has deteriorated sharply. European pipeline volumes collapsed from roughly 150 bcm in 2021 to about 25 bcm in 2024, mostly through TurkStream and the Ukraine transit corridor that Kyiv allowed to expire on 1 January 2025.3 Russia's residual negotiating position on pricing eastward depends heavily on Power of Siberia 1 continuing to ramp — which it is doing — but the next 4 bcm increment to 44 bcm gives Moscow little additional pricing power when Beijing already holds the FID decision on Power of Siberia 2.
For LNG traders, the near-term signal is September arrivals. If the 4.32 million ton forecast holds against last September's 5.32 million tons, it would confirm that Chinese demand has not recovered from the mid-year price-driven pullback.4 Watch October forward bookings by Chinese utilities for any rebound, or whether the record January reloading pattern repeats as domestic storage fills ahead of winter.