Think Tank Backs 10bcm Southeast Europe Gas Corridor to Offset Russian Supply Loss
A proposed SEE pipeline route faces a supply credibility problem, with Azerbaijan already drawing on Russian gas to meet its existing European commitments.
A think tank argued on Wednesday (2026-09-16) that a gas corridor through Southeast Europe with annual capacity of 10 billion cubic meters could compensate for the end of Russian pipeline supply to the region, Montel reported. ICE Endex TTF front-month gas was last quoted at €79.54/MWh at Friday's close (2026-09-19).7
The backdrop to the proposal is the lapsed Ukraine-Russia transit arrangement that had routed gas to southeastern European buyers. The Centre for European Policy Analysis estimated that arrangement was worth roughly $5 billion annually to the Kremlin. Serbia had already moved in early 2026 to secure Russian gas through an alternative Balkan routing via Bulgaria, a workaround that illustrated the acute supply pressure on SEE markets even before transit formally ended, DW reported.3,4
The 10bcm figure sits within reach of Southern Gas Corridor infrastructure on paper. But the corridor's primary supplier is under strain. Azerbaijan delivered roughly 12 billion cubic meters to Europe through the corridor in 2023, according to CEPA data, and Eurasianet has since reported that Azerbaijan is now importing Russian gas to cover those European commitments. A source close to the Shah Deniz consortium, the field that underpins all Azerbaijani gas exports, confirmed to Eurasianet that no new export contracts have been signed beyond existing volumes.3,5
That means the corridor is running at capacity rather than offering room to expand. The think tank's 10bcm claim may describe physical pipeline capacity rather than available non-Russian supply. The two are not the same.5
The complication for any SEE route is that Azerbaijan drawing on Russian molecules to fulfil its European anti-dependency agreements removes the clean-supply premise the corridor was built on. Signed contracts backing new volumes would change that reading. None have surfaced publicly.5
Russia itself offers no spare capacity for European re-engagement. Gas output fell 3.2% in the first half of 2025 to roughly 334.8 billion cubic meters, Bloomberg reported in July 2025. LNG production dropped 5.1% to around 16.5 million tons in the same period, according to federal statistics data cited by Bloomberg. Pipeline exports to China via Power of Siberia are projected to climb more than 20% toward the line's 38 billion cubic meter annual ceiling, a Reuters source said in December 2025. Moscow is directing available volumes east.2,6
CEPA was direct about what any partial Russian re-engagement would mean in practice. Channelling gas through Ukrainian pipelines, even through nominal third-party intermediaries, continues to generate Kremlin hard currency and preserves Gazprom's transit role, the think tank argued in May 2026. The $5 billion annual figure is one Kremlin planners have already absorbed into a constrained financial model, making its absence consequential.3
The broader substitution problem was laid out by a Dutch-based think tank in May 2026: replacing Russian gas with US LNG substitutes one dependency for another, exposing buyers to transatlantic price shocks and competing American LNG demand, Montel reported. SEE governments weighing the 10bcm proposal face that same calculation — a new corridor shifts counterparty exposure rather than eliminating it.1
The 10bcm SEE proposal is meaningful only if the gas behind it is contracted and verifiably non-Russian. With Shah Deniz showing no new export deals and Azerbaijan already drawing on Russian imports to cover existing European volumes, the corridor that would carry any new SEE route has less headroom than the headline capacity number implies. What traders and policymakers should watch is whether Baku signs new supply contracts before any SEE infrastructure commitment is made — absent those, the proposal describes a pipe without gas.5,3