Russia's Central Asia gas push accelerates as Gazprom deliveries climb on new supply route
Moscow is redirecting pipeline gas toward Central Asia after European losses, but Ukraine's refinery strikes are undermining the region's fuel security.
Central Asia's energy market is experiencing a rapid shake-up as Ukraine's drone campaign against Russian infrastructure forces the region to rethink supply dependencies, Oilprice reported on 2026-08-10, with Central Asian states now rushing to diversify fuel-supply options as Russia stands to lose leverage and market share over the long term.6
Gazprom's gas deliveries to Uzbekistan rose 15% in 2025 to 6.48 billion cubic meters, up from 5.64 billion cubic meters in 2024, according to the company's annual report. The increase of nearly 840 million cubic meters comes as Moscow pushes deeper into Central Asian markets that once looked to Russia only for occasional balancing supplies.3
Russian pipeline gas to Central Asia has climbed nearly 70% overall as Moscow works to replace revenue lost after European buyers cut imports following the invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials set new pipeline export targets in early 2024 specifically to court Central Asian buyers and Slovakia, Upstream reported at the time.8
Uzbekistan has become the anchor buyer, having signed a contract with Gazprom in mid-2023 for 9 billion cubic meters annually, and delivery numbers are now tracking toward that level. The arrangement gives Moscow a partial buffer against its shrinking Western customer base while providing Uzbekistan a winter backstop for its aging production infrastructure.
Yet the volumes remain small compared to what Russia once sent west. Exports via the Power of Siberia pipeline alone are projected to increase by over 20% this year to reach China, hitting maximum design capacity of 38 billion cubic meters annually. Central Asia's entire import appetite is a fraction of Europe's former take.1
Russia's broader gas production is also contracting. Output of natural and associated gas reached roughly 334.8 billion cubic meters by June, down 3.2% year-on-year, while LNG production fell 5.1% to about 16.5 million tonnes over the same period, federal statistics show.1
Power of Siberia flows to China returned to winter highs in June, with daily volumes hitting 112 million cubic meters during peak demand in December 2025 and January 2026 before settling back to the 110 million cubic meter design rate. But total pipeline gas supplies to China still fell 2% in June to 6.632 billion cubic meters, Chinese customs data show, with Uzbekistan cutting exports 60% and Turkmenistan cutting 5%, while Kazakhstan increased 15%.7
The Central Asian pivot has a vulnerable flank in fuel, not gas. Ukraine's sustained drone strikes on Russian refineries have created a gasoline-supply crunch spilling into Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states that lack domestic refining capacity. Kyrgyzstan appealed for help during the week of 2026-06-29, Rigzone reported, and the disruptions pushed the region into what Oilprice described as an energy crisis.4,5
Gazprom expands pipeline sales to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan while Russian fuel exports those same countries depend on become unreliable collateral damage in the Ukraine war. Central Asian governments are drawing the obvious lesson, with Oilprice reporting on 2026-08-10 that the region is now rushing to diversify fuel-supply options as repeated Ukrainian strikes erode Russia's market position.6
China remains the larger strategic prize, and the pricing dispute over Power of Siberia 2 is far from resolved. Beijing has sought terms matching Russia's domestic rate of around $120-130 per 1,000 cubic meters, while Moscow seeks terms closer to Power of Siberia 1. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov said on 2026-05-19 that the project "will be discussed in great detail between the leaders," but the gap is wide enough to keep the planned 2,600-kilometer, 50 billion cubic meter pipeline stalled.2
Chinese LNG imports rose 2% in June to 5.5 million tonnes, with Russia the third-largest supplier at 645,000 tonnes, up 19% year-on-year, behind Australia at 2.25 million tonnes and Malaysia at 736,000 tonnes. Beijing also returned to active LNG trading in June, reselling 292 million tonnes — 5% of total imports — underscoring how the world's biggest gas buyer now operates as both consumer and merchant.7
The unresolved risk sits in the fuel chain. Ukrainian drone campaigns have shown they can disrupt Russian refining with near impunity, and Central Asia has no buffer if those strikes intensify before winter. A cold season with constrained Russian gasoline and diesel supply would test whether Tashkent and Astana view Moscow as a reliable partner or merely the cheapest option still available.6