Wright Forecasts Venezuela Oil Output More Than Doubling as U.S. Lease Model Takes Shape
Wright's doubling forecast runs far ahead of what investors can currently finance, with Rystad flagging contractual risk from any future Caracas administration.
U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on Wednesday (2026-09-02) that Venezuela's crude oil production could more than double within a few years, driven by new investment deals being negotiated with American and other foreign energy companies. The statement came during Wright's second visit to Caracas since U.S. forces seized former President Nicolás Maduro in January, a trip that signals Washington is treating Venezuela less as a diplomatic problem and more as a production asset.6,7
ICE Brent crude front-month was at $96.28 a barrel as of Monday (2026-09-07). That sits well above the breakeven for most existing Venezuelan fields with decent reserves — the Economist reported in May (2026-05-19) that many analysts expect surpluses to push prices toward $50 a barrel, possibly below, this year and next. A doubling of Venezuelan supply would accelerate that move.1
Venezuela currently produces around 1.25 million barrels per day, a figure a senior PDVSA official flagged as the end-of-month target as of mid-August (2026-08-17). Half of that volume is already flowing to American refiners — "north of 500,000 barrels" per day, a U.S. official said that same week. Washington is also exporting more than 100,000 barrels of naphtha daily to Venezuela to upgrade its heavy crude yields, embedding a bilateral supply dependency before the deal framework is formalised.3
Doubling from 1.25 million barrels a day would mean production approaching 2.5 million. Rystad Energy puts the capital cost of restoring Venezuelan output to where it was fifteen years ago at $110 billion by 2030 — roughly twice the combined worldwide capital expenditure of U.S. oil majors in 2024. The Economist's more conservative scenario from May (2026-05-19) has Venezuela reaching only 1.5 million barrels per day by end-2027, still short of a doubling. The infrastructure assumptions behind that figure have not yet been tested by real capital.1
Washington is still working through the legal architecture. Sources told CNBC TV18 on August 28 (2026-08-28) that a "lease" model is under consideration as the vehicle for U.S. access to Venezuelan reserves, with individual fields then allocated to producers through auctions or tenders. One source described the negotiations as happening "at the highest levels" of both governments. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve held around 290 million barrels as of late August (2026-08-28), about 41% of its underground cavern capacity, giving Washington additional incentive to lock in long-term supply access rather than draw reserves down further.4
Venezuela moved on shorter-cycle deals in August (2026-08-19). The country signed agreements with oilfield services firm SLB and Hunt Oil, with oil minister Paula Henao announcing the transactions in a televised statement. Services and development contracts can accelerate field-level activity in the near term but are distinct from the lease structures needed to attract the long-cycle capital Wright's forecast implies.3
ConocoPhillips offered the clearest dissent from the industry side. The company's head said in May (2026-05-21) that Venezuela's initial steps to attract foreign investors "fall well short" of what is needed to convince firms to commit. Regulatory and fiscal terms had not shifted enough to justify long-cycle capital deployment, in the company's view. Rystad sharpened that point in an assessment published around Wednesday (2026-09-02), warning that a future Venezuelan government with a new electoral mandate could face domestic pressure to renegotiate fiscal terms or revisit development rights, "creating contractual risk for companies evaluating long-cycle investment decisions."2,8
The strategic rationale for Washington extends beyond supply security. Trend.az reported on August 28 (2026-08-28) that the capacity to rapidly increase Venezuelan output would give the U.S. leverage in global oil markets if supplies tighten elsewhere. Venezuela's OPEC membership adds a further dimension: any sustained production increase coordinated with Washington would test the cartel's ability to enforce its own quota discipline from within.5
Some investors have moved, though on a limited scale. The Economist reported in May (2026-05-19) that one vehicle was seeking to raise $2 billion from institutional investors to take over Venezuelan assets capable of producing between 20,000 and 50,000 barrels per day. That is a fraction of the $110 billion Rystad believes the country ultimately needs.1
Whether ConocoPhillips and other majors that passed on earlier Venezuelan terms revise their positions now that Wright has publicly backed the doubling thesis remains the central industry question. Rystad's warning that any successor government in Caracas could renegotiate or rescind terms will feature in every capital committee presentation until contracts are signed.8,2