Ukraine's Drone War Undermines Russia's Gas Push Into Central Asia
Moscow boosted gas deliveries to Uzbekistan by 15% in 2025, but Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries are now forcing the region to diversify away from Russian supply.
Ukraine's sustained drone campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is reshaping Central Asia's fuel market faster than Moscow's pipeline strategy can compensate, oilprice.com reported on August 10 (2026-08-10), with Central Asian governments accelerating diversification efforts as repeated strikes expose the fragility of their Russian supply dependence.6
Gazprom's annual report shows deliveries to Uzbekistan reached 6.48 billion cubic meters in 2025, up 15% from 5.64 billion cubic meters in 2024, part of a nearly 70% increase in Russian gas supplies across Central Asia. Moscow framed the regional push as a deliberate strategy to recover export revenues lost when European buyers cut ties, with Kremlin officials announcing fresh pipeline export targets in January 2024 (2026-01-25) that explicitly courted Central Asian states and Slovakia as alternative buyers.3,8
But the volume gains in gas have not insulated the region from Russia's broader energy problems. A Russian gasoline-supply crunch began spilling into Central Asia in early July, with Kyrgyzstan saying during the week of June 29 (2026-06-29) that it had appealed for help, underscoring how landlocked nations with limited domestic fuel production remain acutely exposed to disruptions in Russian supply chains.4
The refinery strikes turned that crunch into something worse. By July 10 (2026-07-10), oilprice.com characterized the situation as an energy crisis across Central Asian countries, driven by years of short-term policy choices that left the region without a coordinated energy strategy or adequate supply alternatives to absorb a major Russian outage.5
Russia's ability to sustain the Central Asia supply push is also constrained by conditions at home. Total gas production fell 3.2% year-on-year in the first half of 2025 to roughly 334.8 billion cubic meters, according to federal statistics cited by Bloomberg News, while LNG output dropped 5.1% to about 16.5 million tonnes over the same period.1
China has not filled the gap left by European demand. The Power of Siberia pipeline reached its design capacity of 38 billion cubic meters annually, equivalent to 110 million cubic meters per day, according to Chinese customs data, and winter peaks in December 2025 and January 2026 briefly pushed daily flows to 112 mcm before they settled back. Yet total pipeline gas exports to China still fell 2% in June to 6.632 bcm, with Uzbekistan cutting its own pipeline exports to China by 60% and Turkmenistan trimming 5%, even as Kazakhstan increased volumes 15%.7
LNG flows offered Russia modest relief. Chinese LNG imports rose 2% in June to 5.5 million tonnes, and Russia ranked third among suppliers with 645,000 tonnes, up 19%, trailing Australia's 2.25 million tonnes and Malaysia's 736,000 tonnes. China also returned to active LNG trading in June, reselling 292 million tonnes, or 5% of its total imports. Combined pipeline gas and LNG imports into China edged down 0.2% year-on-year to 13.706 bcm in June, leaving Russia still far from compensating for what it has lost westward.7
The longer-range solution Moscow has pushed — Power of Siberia 2, a planned 2,600-kilometer pipeline from Yamal fields to China with a projected annual capacity of 50 billion cubic meters — remains stalled on pricing. President Vladimir Putin raised it with Xi Jinping when he arrived in Beijing on Wednesday (2026-05-20), with Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov saying on Tuesday (2026-05-19) the project "will be discussed in great detail between the leaders." China has sought pricing aligned with Russia's domestic rate of around $120-130 per 1,000 cubic meters; Moscow wants terms closer to the existing Power of Siberia 1 contract. No agreement has been reported.2
The upshot for Central Asia is a seller trying to grow its regional footprint while its own production is declining and its largest prospective alternative buyer is holding out on price. ICE Brent crude front-month settled at $94.97 per barrel as of September 5 (2026-09-05) close, against Urals at $86.70, a discount that reflects both sanctions pressure and the market's skepticism about Russian supply reliability.
Whether Gazprom can hold its Central Asian delivery volumes through the winter heating season will depend partly on whether Ukrainian drone strikes keep degrading Russian energy infrastructure. Central Asian governments are not waiting to find out. Their diversification drive is already underway, and each fresh disruption to Russian fuel flows gives it more urgency.6