BRICS Added Record Fossil Capacity in 2025 as Political Cohesion Frays
Security disputes and China-India strategic divergence are eroding BRICS coordination just as the bloc's energy appetite hits new highs.
A Foreign Policy analysis published Wednesday (2026-09-02) found that security disputes and strategic divergence have eroded much of the momentum BRICS generated with its landmark 2023 Johannesburg expansion, raising questions about the bloc's ability to coordinate on energy markets where its member states carry enormous collective weight.7
BRICS members collectively added a net 115 gigawatts of fossil fuel capacity in 2025 — the bloc's largest ever annual net gain — even as China and India posted record solar and wind additions, according to Global Energy Monitor's Global Electricity Review cited by Asian Power in June (2026-06-03). ICE Brent crude front-month was trading at $94.96 a barrel on Wednesday (2026-09-02) and JKM front-month Asian LNG at $23.61 per MMBtu. Those figures reflect markets pricing Chinese and Indian demand growth with BRICS political dynamics largely in the background.3
China's commanding economic position within BRICS shapes every energy coordination question. China was 5% of global GDP when it attended the Bandung conference in 1955; it is now 20% and the world's second-largest economy, the Economist noted in May (2026-05-19). That weight gives Beijing agenda-setting power within BRICS forums that smaller members, including Brazil and Egypt, cannot match.1,2
For energy traders, bloc coherence matters in concrete ways. If BRICS members coordinate LNG procurement or crude purchasing, they carry enough combined demand to move spot markets. If they compete independently — which is closer to the current reality — India and China bid against each other, and exporters capture the premium. Newcastle coal physical was at $135.44 per tonne on Wednesday (2026-09-02), supported in part by Indian and Chinese import demand running on separate tracks.3
India is the clearest fault line. A Foreign Policy piece from August 28 (2026-08-28) found that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which shares significant membership and security aims with BRICS, has expanded so broadly it has diluted its strategic usefulness for New Delhi. The SCO now has 10 full members, two observers, and 15 dialogue partners, stretching well beyond Central Asia to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia. India joined to engage with Central Asia; the forum it participates in now looks quite different.6
India's strategic drift has been visible on the currency question too. After Trump threatened in 2025 to impose 100% tariffs on goods from countries that launched a BRICS currency, India's foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar moved quickly to rule out any such plans. That public alignment with Washington's redlines undercut China's vision for BRICS as an alternative financial architecture, and the episode exposed how far apart Beijing and New Delhi actually are on the bloc's purpose.1
China, meanwhile, is directing capital domestically rather than into bloc coordination mechanisms. Reuters, citing a Mission Possible Partnership report published in June (2026-06-08), found that China accounted for the majority of low-carbon projects among $43 billion in total clean energy funding secured over the previous six months.4
Military asymmetry reinforces the diplomatic gap. China's defence budget runs to roughly $336 billion, a figure that SIPRI data suggest understates actual spending, while the combined defence budgets of Brazil, India, and South Africa amount to around $190 billion, according to War on the Rocks in June (2026-06-19). That imbalance creates friction in any BRICS security discussion and gives other members reason to seek countervailing partnerships outside the bloc.5
Egypt joined BRICS at the 2023 Johannesburg summit but has not repositioned its energy market relationships as a result. It remains a LNG transit state with Gulf-linked supply chains that predate its BRICS membership and show no sign of realigning. Dubai crude was at $88.75 a barrel on Wednesday (2026-09-02), a $6.21 discount to ICE Brent front-month, reflecting Gulf producers' continued willingness to sell to BRICS and non-BRICS buyers alike.7
Asia's share of global GDP has more than doubled from 17% in 1950 to 44% in 2022, while Africa's share has stagnated around 3%, the Economist reported. The aggregate demand weight of BRICS nations in energy markets is not shrinking. But whether that weight gets applied as a coordinated bloc or as a collection of national interests pursuing separate agendas is the variable commodity desks should track — starting with India's LNG contract renewal decisions in the quarters ahead.1