Central Asia bets on Afghan trade routes as Russian gas talks stall

Central Asia bets on Afghan trade routes as Russian gas talks stall Tashkent officials pushed Afghanistan into regional trade networks worth billions, even as Power of Siberia 2's price standoff keeps Central Asian gas central to China. Senior officials from across Central and South Asia gathered in Tashkent on June 4 (2026-06-04) and agreed, unanimously, that Afghanistan needs to be pulled into the region's trade networks. The meeting, held under a format called the Termez Dialogue, produced a resolution urging transport networks viable enough to knit connectivity across Central and South Asia. Uzbek and Afghan entities have already signed deals worth roughly $5 billion since the fall of 2025.⁴ That matters for energy because the corridor in question is also an energy corridor. Central Asia is one of China's largest piped-gas suppliers, and the connectivity the Tashkent officials want runs through the same transit geography that would link landlocked Central Asian supply to South Asian demand. Move the freight, and you move the case for moving molecules.^4,1 Not everyone is on board. The EU has held the line on engaging the Taliban administration, according to oilprice.com, leaving Central Asian governments to push integration on their own terms while Western capitals keep their distance.⁴ The existing flows show what is at stake. Three pipelines originating in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan cross Kazakhstan into China's Xinjiang region, supplying over 40 bcm of natural gas a year, and China's pipeline gas imports reached 59.4 million tonnes in 2025.¹ For now, Central Asian gas is the bird in hand for Beijing. That position is reinforced by how slowly the alternative is moving. Russia's Power of Siberia 2, a 2,600-kilometre line designed to carry 50 bcm a year from the Yamal fields to China via Mongolia, remains stuck on price. China reportedly wants terms near Russia's domestic rate of around $120-130 per 1,000 cubic metres; Moscow is holding out for something closer to the existing Power of Siberia 1 contract.^2,1 Power of Siberia 1 delivered about 38 bcm to China in 2025, and at their September (2025-09) meeting Mr Putin and Mr Xi agreed to lift its capacity toward 44 bcm.¹ China's 15th five-year plan, released in March (2026-03), committed only to advancing "early-stage" work on the larger pipeline.¹ That is not the language of a deal about to close. So the haggling over Russian gas leaves Central Asia's piped exports with more leverage, not less. Turkmen and Uzbek volumes already flow; new Russian gas is years and a pricing fight away.^1,2 China's appetite is not in doubt. Its imports of Russian oil jumped 35% year on year in the first quarter, and Kpler's Muyu Xu put onshore crude inventory at around 1.23 billion barrels, roughly 92 days of refining needs.² A buyer stockpiling that aggressively has every reason to keep multiple supply routes open, and Central Asia is one of them. The region is hedging on more than gas. India signed a 2026 uranium contract with Central Asian suppliers, a tie-up framed as a strategic bridge for energy security and geopolitical diversification.³ Connectivity is being built across several fuels at once, with different partners pulling in different directions. The unresolved question is whether the Tashkent ambitions become actual infrastructure or stay diplomatic theatre. A $5 billion run of Uzbek-Afghan deals is real money. But transport corridors through Afghanistan have a long history of announcements that outrun construction, and a resolution calling for networks that are "financially sustainable" is an admission that the financing is not yet there.⁴ Watch two things. Whether the EU softens its stance on Taliban trade ties, which would unlock Western financing the corridor currently lacks, and whether the Power of Siberia 2 pricing gap closes, which would change how hard Beijing needs to court Central Asian gas.^4,2 Both are moving slowly. Neither is settled.