No Russian LNG Through Bab el-Mandeb Since February as Med Attack Deters Asian Route

No Russian LNG Through Bab el-Mandeb Since February as Med Attack Deters Asian Route An alleged attack on a Russian vessel has shut the shortest export lane to Asia, adding transit time and squeezing earnings from Yamal deliveries. No LNG tankers have transited the Bab el-Mandeb strait since an alleged attack on a Russian vessel in the Mediterranean earlier this month, vessel-tracking data showed, cutting off the quickest route for Russian LNG to reach Asian buyers.¹ That matters because the closure forces Russian cargoes onto longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages and raising shipping costs at a moment when Russia's LNG earnings are already under pressure from a broader deterioration in its gas export position.¹ The timing is awkward for Moscow. Russia had been counting on LNG growth to partially offset the collapse in its pipeline business. The economy ministry's projections show LNG exports edging up only 3% this year to 35.7 million metric tons, a figure already below earlier forecasts, while pipeline gas exports outside the former Soviet Union are expected to fall 10.7% to 72 billion cubic metres.³ Gazprom, the pipeline arm, booked nearly $7 billion in losses in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, after Europe — once its dominant customer — sharply curtailed purchases. Russian gas now accounts for just 18% of European imports, against 45% in 2021.³ The LNG arm has been a relative bright spot, but the route disruption complicates the picture. JKM spot markets are showing a contrarian bullish signal on supply grounds, suggesting some traders expect the added transit friction to tighten near-term Asian availability. Whether that translates into sustained price support depends on how long the Bab el-Mandeb remains closed to Russian shipping.¹ Meanwhile, Europe continues to absorb the bulk of what Russia does export by sea. Urgewald, an environmental NGO, reported that EU countries paid Russia EUR 2.9 billion for around 5.1 million tonnes of LNG in the first quarter of 2026, up from 4.3 million tonnes in the same period a year earlier. Ninety-seven percent of all Yamal Arctic LNG deliveries in Q1 went to the EU, Urgewald said, describing Europe as "the indispensable market for Russia's flagship LNG project."² That dependency runs in both directions, which makes the geopolitics difficult. European buyers have been reducing Russian pipeline exposure for three years, but seaborne LNG from the same supplier continues to flow and, for now, continues to grow. Industry experts told Montel that historically low gas storage levels and uncertainty around future Qatari supply could eventually push Europe back toward Russian pipeline gas, though that outcome depends on political will that has so far held.⁵ Russia's broader energy revenue picture reflects the same contradictions. The economy ministry raised its combined oil and gas export revenue forecast for 2025 to $206.1 billion from $200.3 billion, driven largely by an upward revision to oil volumes — now seen at 240.1 million tons, up from 229.7 million tons. But the 2026 figure was cut to $215.2 billion from $220.4 billion, suggesting Moscow expects the revenue improvement to be temporary.³ Gas production tells a similar story of contraction. Output reached approximately 334.8 billion cubic metres in the first half of last year, a 3.2% decline year on year, with LNG production falling 5.1% to around 16.5 million tons over the same period. Exports via the Power of Siberia pipeline to China are projected to rise more than 20% this year toward maximum capacity of 38 billion cubic metres annually, but Bloomberg data from mid-2025 suggested that Chinese demand was not growing fast enough to offset what Russia had lost in Europe.⁴ The Bulgarian gas exchange Balkan Gas Hub launched a new LNG auction service in April, as the region prepares to replace Russian pipeline volumes ahead of the EU's phase-out deadline. A Hungarian trader told Montel that LNG demand would grow in the coming year as pipeline deliveries wind down, with the shift becoming permanent once Russian deliveries stop in 2027.⁶ The variable to watch now is how long the Bab el-Mandeb closure persists and whether other Russian LNG operators adjust routing in response. If the diversion around the Cape becomes standard practice, effective export capacity tightens — not through production cuts but through vessel utilisation. For Asian buyers counting on Yamal cargoes, the question is whether the higher freight cost gets absorbed by the seller or passed through in cargo pricing.¹