Southeast Asia Energy Industry Reads Coal Rebound as Temporary, Not a Reset
A SEAS survey finds 90% of regional energy professionals hit by geopolitical disruption, but only 6% see the coal uptick as a lasting directional shift.
Nine in ten energy professionals across Southeast Asia report being affected by geopolitical disruptions to supply — and the industry's dominant read is that the coal increase that followed is a fix, not a pivot. A survey published Thursday (2026-08-27) by the Sustainable Energy Association of Singapore found that 40% of respondents viewed the recent rise in coal use as a short-term response to energy security concerns, while 28% described it as a mid-term bridge measure. Just 6% saw it as evidence of a structural return to coal.7
Strait of Hormuz disruptions earlier this year delivered the shock that forced the question. Asian countries, deeply exposed to fuel imports transiting that chokepoint — which carries roughly a fifth of global oil flows — scrambled for available generation capacity when LNG supply tightened. Coal plants came back online. The response was fast, visible, and, according to most regional industry participants, uncomfortable.1,2
The SEAS data puts numbers to that discomfort. Of the 90% of respondents who reported being affected by geopolitical developments, 59% said the impact was moderate to severe, and 24% described it as severe. The most common reported effect — cited by 39% of respondents — was greater interest in local or regional energy solutions rather than international supply chains. Delayed investment decisions came second, at 38%.7
That investment hesitation is where the data gets complicated. Southeast Asia ended last year with record renewable spending: US$17 billion invested in clean energy capacity, adding 8 GW, with clean-energy spending outpacing fossil-fuel generation investment by a two-to-one ratio, according to figures published by Asian Power on Monday (2026-08-24). Yet the pipeline had already narrowed before the current crisis — around 12 GW of planned renewable capacity was cancelled in 2024.6
Alnie Demoral, Southeast Asia analyst at Ember, was direct about the supply shock's likely legacy. "We see this shift as largely a short-term response rather than a long-term direction," Demoral said, adding that the measures address immediate supply gaps without resetting decarbonisation trajectories. Analysts at WoodMac made a comparable call on Indonesia specifically, noting the country is placing "greater emphasis on accelerating solar deployment alongside selective gas development" in response to the disruption rather than doubling down on coal.2,5
The IEA's capacity trajectory figures suggest the underlying build-out ambition hasn't collapsed. Southeast Asia held around 120 GW of renewable capacity as of 2024; the agency projects that figure could nearly triple to around 360 GW by 2035 under current policy settings, and potentially jump fivefold if all announced targets are achieved. Coal's interim resurgence sits awkwardly against those projections, but the SEAS survey suggests industry participants aren't treating them as mutually exclusive.5
Grid infrastructure is the more immediate constraint. More than 70% of SEAS survey respondents identified grid buildout and regional connectivity as the main obstacle to the energy transition — a share that dwarfs those citing skills shortages or slow storage deployment, each at 5%. Regional interconnection has been discussed for years across ASEAN; the crisis appears to have sharpened urgency without producing a mechanism to act on it.7
The LNG market is still recalibrating. Platts JKM LNG front-month was trading at $22.94 per MMBtu on Thursday (2026-08-27), elevated relative to pre-crisis norms and reflecting continued tightness in spot cargoes. Newcastle thermal coal, the seaborne benchmark for Pacific Basin power generators, was at $124.20 per tonne on Thursday (2026-08-27). Neither price level is comfortable for import-dependent Southeast Asian utilities operating outside long-term contract cover.1
Russian state entities have stepped into the supply gap in some markets, offering nuclear cooperation and alternative fossil fuel supply to governments looking for non-Gulf options. That creates leverage relationships the region's governments will have to manage regardless of how the Hormuz situation resolves.4
ASEAN energy planning documents from before the Iran war envisioned gas capacity reaching nearly 200 GW by 2030 — almost double the 106 GW in place at the time. With Qatari LNG exports disrupted and spot market prices elevated, those plans are under review, and the pace of any gas buildout now depends heavily on when Gulf supply normalises. Two Indian LPG shipments totalling more than 92,700 tons managing to transit the Strait of Hormuz was notable enough to register as a market signal.3,1
The number that matters for market positioning is 38% — the share of SEAS respondents reporting delayed investment decisions. Whether those delays compound into project cancellations similar in scale to the 12 GW lost in 2024 will shape the region's generation mix well past any near-term Hormuz resolution.7,6