Japan Sees September Crude Imports at 80% of 2025 Monthly Average, Minister Says
Tokyo's recovery forecast signals a partial but costly return of barrels, with Japan's July import bill already at an all-time high.
Japan's crude imports in September are expected to reach about 80% of the average monthly volume for 2025, energy minister Ryosei Akazawa said, as quoted by Reuters on Tuesday (2026-08-25). The forecast is the clearest official indication that Tokyo sees the worst of the supply shock easing, even as the Bab el-Mandeb strait remains contested and ICE Brent crude front-month traded at $89.68/bbl as of 14:48 UTC on 2026-08-25.3
An 80% recovery figure implies a staged return, not a snap-back to normal sourcing. The scale of the hole it must fill is considerable. Japan's crude imports crashed by 65.7% year on year in April to 4.07 million kilolitres, or about 850,000 bpd, according to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's monthly petroleum statistics. Imports from the Middle East, which supplied more than 90% of Japan's total crude before the U.S.-Israel war with Iran began at the end of February, plunged 68% in that month alone.1
Saudi Arabian supply to Japan fell by nearly 58% in April, and UAE shipments dropped by 69.4%, official data showed. The losses were not spread evenly across suppliers — they were concentrated precisely in the routes most exposed to Bab el-Mandeb transit risk.1
The cost side makes the partial recovery look even more uncomfortable. Japan's total import bill reached an all-time high of $76.39 billion in July, up 27.8% from July 2025, Reuters reported. Crude volumes that month rose only 5.5% year on year, yet the oil bill surged 87.8%, breaking the previous record set in June. More barrels came in; the invoice still hit a record.6
Akazawa's 80% guidance sits directly inside that price environment. The EIA, in its August Short-Term Energy Outlook, raised its third-quarter Brent forecast to $85/bbl, citing severe constraints on transits through the Strait of Hormuz. The agency said it does not assume the Bab el-Mandeb threats have caused additional crude production shut-ins beyond what is already offline.5,4
ICE Brent front-month at $89.68/bbl as of 14:48 UTC on 2026-08-25 sits above that EIA quarterly forecast. Traders appear to be pricing continued transit risk into the forward curve rather than treating the strait situation as resolved. The EIA's June 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook had already assumed the Strait of Hormuz would remain effectively closed in the near term, with oil shipments resuming only later in the third quarter.2
For Japan, the bottleneck is less about global supply volumes than about route access. Bab el-Mandeb remains a contested transit point for Saudi and UAE crude heading toward Asian buyers. The cross-sector price chain — Bab el-Mandeb threat to diesel, then Brent, then gasoline — raises the landed cost of each cargo regardless of whether Japan manages to secure the volume.4
The 20% shortfall implied by the 80% forecast still represents a meaningful gap against pre-disruption intake. Japanese refiners and utilities would need to cover the difference either through more expensive non-Middle Eastern barrels or by drawing on strategic and commercial stocks. Both options carry cost.1
There is also an interpretive question embedded in the minister's forecast. If the 80% figure reflects cargoes already nominated for September, it suggests traders and refiners have found cover through alternative suppliers or re-routed vessels. If it is an estimate rather than confirmed liftings, the actual landing could come in lower, given the EIA's August warning that production constraints would further reduce inventories.4
Currency compounds the pressure. USD/JPY stood at 159.21 as of 14:48 UTC on 2026-08-25, meaning dollar-denominated crude is more expensive in yen terms than it would be under a stronger currency. Every dollar of Brent strength adds directly to the import bill pressure that already produced July's record figure.6
The September METI petroleum statistics, due around late October, will be the first hard test of whether the 80% figure holds. Until then, the unresolved variable is whether Bab el-Mandeb transits stabilise before Japan's winter restocking season begins in earnest. The EIA assumes no additional production shut-ins from the strait threats — if that assumption proves wrong, the minister's September forecast will look optimistic against the data when it arrives.4