Rosatom Presses Uzbekistan Nuclear Deal as State Finances Fray
Rosatom's disclosed financial strain and a 4.15% drop in uranium equities on Tuesday raise questions about Russia's capacity to fund Central Asian reactor projects.
Uranium-focused equities fell 4.15% on Tuesday (2026-08-18), with the URA exchange-traded fund settling at $43.46, as financial pressure on Rosatom, the dominant force in global nuclear construction, resurfaced for investors. Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev has publicly announced that the company is experiencing major financial difficulties, according to oilprice.com, a disclosure that sits in direct tension with its expanding pipeline of reactor commitments in Central Asia.5
The scale of Rosatom's position explains why its financial condition matters for Central Asian energy planners. The World Nuclear Association puts Rosatom's share of the global export market for nuclear reactors at about 65%. Rosatom reported that its foreign operations generated more than $16 billion in revenue in 2023, including more than $7 billion from new power plants, many funded by Russian state loans, up from nearly $9 billion in 2021. A firm that finances its own export deals faces a very different problem when state credit tightens than one that competes on technology alone.1
Uzbekistan is building out generation capacity and has included nuclear as part of that programme, with Rosatom holding the agreement for a planned plant, according to au.finance.yahoo.com. No revised construction timeline or financing arrangement has been announced publicly since Likhachev's disclosure.6,5
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan's reliance on Russian energy supply has deepened on the gas side. Gazprom's annual report shows natural gas deliveries to Uzbekistan reached 6.48 billion cubic meters in 2025, up 15% from 5.64 billion cubic meters in 2024 — an additional 840 million cubic meters year on year. Russian officials said in October 2025 that the existing supply contract provides for annual volumes of up to 7.7 billion cubic meters, with scope for further increases. Infrastructure work under way would expand Uzbekistan's daily import capacity from 9 million to 32 million cubic meters, according to Trend.az.3
The gas trajectory and the unresolved nuclear timeline pull in opposite directions, but both deepen Uzbekistan's exposure to Russian supply. More gas infrastructure locks in procurement relationships regardless of what happens to the reactor project.3,5
The parallel with Kazakhstan sharpens the picture. An Interfax report put the price of the proposed Lake Balkhash plant in the billions, but Kazakhstani officials have still not disclosed a clear financing plan, oilprice.com reported. China has started to fill part of that gap. In June 2026, Chinese National Energy Administration chief Wang Hongzhi visited Astana for the inaugural meeting of a Kazakhstan-China joint energy working group, and officials from both countries signed a nuclear cooperation protocol, Eurasianet reported. Uzbekistan has not signalled any equivalent reorientation.2,4
Russia's grip on the nuclear fuel cycle compounds any country's exposure to Rosatom as a vendor. Russia controls 44% of global uranium enrichment capacity, according to The Economist, and earned approximately $2.7 billion from enriched uranium exports in 2023, primarily to the United States and the European Union. Signing a reactor deal with Rosatom typically means signing a long-term fuel supply relationship too.1
Gazprom's financial deterioration illustrates how severe the pressure on Russian energy companies has become. Oilprice.com reported the company's market capitalisation had fallen to around $25 billion over the three months to July 2026. Rosatom is a state entity without a public share price, but it draws on the same sovereign credit lines that are under strain.5
Uzbekistan's nuclear plant remains a stated commitment from Rosatom, but the financing mechanism has not been made public. If Kazakhstan's June 2026 opening to Chinese nuclear suppliers is any guide, Tashkent may face the same choice before long, and has not yet signalled which way it leans.5,4