Magyar accuses Rosatom of overstating progress on stalled 2.4 GW Paks II nuclear plant
Hungary's new premier says EUR 2.7bn invested in Paks II has produced little beyond two concrete pits, directly contradicting Rosatom's schedule claims.
Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar on Thursday (2026-08-13) publicly challenged Rosatom's assertion that the 2.4 gigawatt Paks II nuclear expansion is proceeding "to schedule," pointing to soaring costs, years of delays and what he described as negligible physical results, Montel reported.6
Magyar's specific charge is hard to dismiss. After EUR 2.7bn had been invested in the project, Hungary had received only "two large concrete pits," he said. That ratio of capital outlay to physical progress sits at the core of the dispute and sets up a direct conflict between Budapest's account and Rosatom's public communications.6
Magyar came to power after his Tisza party's landslide on April 12 (2026-04-12), ending Viktor Orban's 16-year rule. Analysts told Montel at the time that the victory would pull Hungary closer to the EU and begin reducing its dependence on Russian energy. The new prime minister, who won office partly on that platform, now finds himself disputing cost and schedule claims from the Russian partner the country is formally committed to moving away from.3,4
The Paks II confrontation arrived as Hungary's existing nuclear capacity was already under severe stress. Record-low Danube water levels forced the shutdown of the operating Paks nuclear plant, which supplies close to half the country's electricity, prompting Magyar to warn of an energy crisis. The European Commission said it was prepared to convene an emergency meeting of its Electricity Coordination Group, Euronews reported on July 31 (2026-07-31).7
Paks I was expected to restart as early as the evening of Monday (2026-08-10), after rainfall raised Danube water levels enough to allow one turbine to be switched back on. The episode showed how exposed Hungary's power system is to a single river and a single generation site, and how limited its fallback options are when output drops.5
That supply concentration makes the delays at Paks II more than a contractual irritation. Hungary built the expansion into its long-term baseload planning. Every year the new units slip further behind schedule, the gap between the operational life of the existing four Paks reactors and the commissioning of their successors grows wider.6,7
Analysts speaking to Montel in May cautioned that structural barriers would constrain Magyar's government regardless of political intent, with new energy minister Istvan Kapitany expected to inherit the same dependencies that shaped Orban-era decisions. Confidential long-term contracts and the absence of viable alternative infrastructure mean Hungary's energy separation from Russia could take as long as a decade, analysts told Montel on Monday (2026-05-18).2,1
Paks II illustrates those constraints precisely. Cancelling or materially restructuring a project with EUR 2.7bn already committed carries legal and financial costs that cannot be estimated from public disclosures alone. Pressing ahead while schedule slippage continues extends Hungary's dependence on Rosatom contracting and supply chains, which Magyar's government is formally committed to reducing. Neither path is straightforward.6,1
Rosatom's next formal statement on project timelines, and whether Budapest moves toward requesting an independent schedule audit or seeks revised contract terms, is the most concrete signal ahead. Magyar has made the cost-to-progress ratio a public political issue, which narrows Rosatom's room to maintain schedule claims without substantiating them with construction evidence.6