Iraq Plans to Triple Kirkuk-Ceyhan Flows as Hormuz Bypass Race Intensifies
Baghdad's three-month pipeline push tests whether land routes can fill a gap that has now cost over one billion barrels of lost supply.
Iraq plans to triple crude oil exports through Kurdistan to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan within three months, oilprice.com reported, making it the most concrete attempt by a Gulf producer to build an overland alternative since the Strait of Hormuz closed.3 Baghdad is among the producers most exposed to the closure, lacking any bypass route comparable to the UAE's existing Habshan-Fujairah pipeline.
The scale of what Iraq is trying to replace is significant. In 2025, about 18.2 million b/d of crude oil and refined products moved through the strait, which previously handled nearly 20% of global oil supply and roughly one-fifth of global LNG trade, according to Oil and Gas Journal.4 ADNOC CEO Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber said more than one billion barrels have been lost due to the closure, with nearly 100 million additional barrels lost every week the strait stays shut.1
Pipeline flows are nowhere close to covering that gap. Bloomberg reported visible oil flows through the chokepoint at just 1.3 million barrels per day, with another 1.6 million b/d leaving the Gulf of Oman on vessels running dark — turning off their geolocation to avoid detection.5 Flows along the UAE's existing Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline now average about 7.5 million barrels daily, according to Bloomberg.5 Even stacking those numbers, the shortfall from the strait's pre-war 18-million-plus b/d throughput is enormous.
The UAE has moved faster than any other producer. ADNOC's Al Jaber said on Wednesday (2026-05-20) that nearly 50% of a second bypass pipeline had been built, with the existing Habshan-Fujairah line running at up to 1.8 million b/d.1 The Abu Dhabi Media Office announced on Friday (2026-05-15) that construction would be accelerated to double export capacity through Fujairah by 2027.2 Fujairah sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait entirely — a geographic advantage Iraq does not share.
Ceyhan sits on the Mediterranean. To reach it, Iraqi crude must traverse the full length of Turkey. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has historically been shut by sabotage, revenue disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and political deadlock. Tripling flows would require both pipeline integrity and a functioning commercial agreement between two parties with a poor recent track record of sustaining one.3
ICE Brent crude front-month traded at $83.08/bbl as of 2026-08-06, down 0.26%, while NYMEX WTI front-month stood at $78.09/bbl. Those levels are well below what a prolonged Hormuz closure might ordinarily be expected to produce, and the gap between the supply story and the price signal is worth noting. Asian economies, which accounted for nearly 80% of Hormuz oil flows, have slowed consumption enough to absorb part of the shock, Oil and Gas Journal reported.4 Five analyst signals tracked by EnergyReader point bearish on crude, with no bullish weight at all — consistent with a market pricing some form of supply restoration.
Goldman Sachs analysts warned that Hormuz traffic may never fully recover to pre-war levels. Bloomberg cited the bank's forecast that flows could reach only 70% of pre-war volume, or 13 million barrels daily, with that level achievable by end of July, roughly a month after the US and Iran signed a preliminary peace deal.5 On Wednesday (2026-06-17), the presidents of the United States and Iran signed a hard copy of that agreement, under which Iran would reopen the strait in exchange for the US lifting all sanctions against Tehran.5
Al Jaber cautioned that even if the conflict ended immediately, it would take at least four months to ramp oil flows back to 80% of normal levels.1 That timeline assumes port infrastructure and coastal facilities survived largely intact — a significant assumption given reported targeting of tankers and facilities during the war.
For Iraq, the three-month window Baghdad has set itself is tighter than that. Whether Baghdad can secure the commercial terms with Erbil and the security guarantees needed to fill the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line — at triple current volumes — will say a great deal about how quickly land routes can be credibly priced into the post-war supply picture. Goldman's 70% recovery scenario implies roughly 5 million b/d of pre-war flows remain stranded even after a deal holds; if Iraq's pipeline plan stalls, that arithmetic does not improve.5