China's Trade With Uzbekistan Jumps 31 Percent as Russian Pipeline Gas Exceeds Capacity
Beijing's H1 2026 commercial surge into Central Asia coincides with Power of Siberia gas flows already above design limits and Moscow pursuing a western Siberian pipeline expansion.
China's trade with Uzbekistan jumped 31 percent in the first half of 2026 to $8.87 billion, data released on July 30 (2026-07-30) by China's General Administration of Customs showed, cementing Beijing as the Central Asian republic's dominant commercial partner and extending a regional push that now spans nuclear energy, mining and manufactured goods.6
The trade balance ran sharply in China's favor. Beijing exported $7.65 billion worth of goods to Uzbekistan in H1 2026, up from $5.96 billion a year earlier, while Uzbek exports to China grew from $797 million to $1.22 billion — a ratio favoring China by more than six to one. Across all five Central Asian states, China's regional trade reached $52.94 billion, up 6.5 percent from $49.70 billion in H1 2025, with Chinese exports outpacing imports by roughly two to one.6
Kazakhstan was not far behind, lifting bilateral trade with China 25 percent year-on-year to $27.2 billion. In June 2026, China's National Energy Administration chief Wang Hongzhi traveled to Astana for the inaugural meeting of the Kazakhstan-China Joint Working Group on Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy, where officials approved a protocol defining future cooperation in that sphere. A reported $2 billion Chinese investment in Uzbek mining pointed to the same pattern: Beijing is pursuing access to Central Asian resources, not just export markets.4,5,6
Russia remains China's dominant pipeline gas supplier, and the volumes are already testing infrastructure limits. Gazprom shipped 38.8 billion cubic meters through Power of Siberia in 2025, around a quarter more than the prior year and above the line's designed annual capacity of 38 bcm. During Putin's visit to China in September 2025, the two countries agreed to raise annual contracted volumes by a further 6 bcm to 44 bcm. China also agreed in February 2022 to buy up to 10 bcm annually from Sakhalin Island fields by 2027, a figure later revised upward to 12 bcm.2
Combined, those commitments would put Russian pipeline gas deliveries to China above 56 bcm per year. Russia is pressing to go further. Putin sought to advance Power of Siberia 2 in talks with Xi in May 2026 (2026-05-21), a western Siberian pipeline whose routing through Mongolia or Central Asia has been under discussion for years without a final investment decision.1,3
China-Russia overall trade contracted in 2025. Bilateral commerce fell 6.9 percent to $228 billion, the first annual decline since Russia's war with Ukraine began in 2022, according to Chinese data reported in May 2026 (2026-05-21). Putin acknowledged the drop but said the two countries had exceeded $200 billion "by a solid margin" for three consecutive years.1
Not all of China's Central Asian numbers moved in the same direction. Kyrgyzstan's bilateral turnover with China fell from $14.25 billion in H1 2025 to $9.7 billion in H1 2026. Kyrgyz exports to China dropped from $3.89 billion to just $75 million in six months, a swing China's customs data provided no explanation for. Chinese imports from Kyrgyzstan fell more modestly, from $10.36 billion to $9.63 billion.6
The Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan figures suggest China has deepened its commercial footprint in the region even as overall Russia-China trade volumes slipped. Power of Siberia 2 routing remains unresolved, and any Central Asian state that becomes a transit corridor for that pipeline would gain leverage that the current trade data does not yet price in. Kazakhstan's nuclear protocol is the clearest sign that at least one state in the region is already positioning for that conversation.4,1,6