Goldman adds SMRs to uranium model, sees 2.3 billion pound supply deficit by 2045
Goldman now forecasts 46 GW of small modular reactors by 2045, adding 62 million pounds of uranium demand and tightening an already stretched supply picture.
Goldman Sachs formally incorporated small modular reactors into its uranium framework for the first time, projecting cumulative SMR deployments of nearly 46 gigawatts by 2045 — a move that lifts the bank's nuclear generation forecast by roughly 6% and adds an estimated 62 million pounds of additional uranium demand, or a 17% upside to its prior long-term estimates.4,2 The uranium ETF (URA) traded at $42.73, up 4.51% on Monday (2026-08-04), a session where crude and gas moved in opposite directions and most energy complex participants found little to cheer about. [LIVE_PRICES]
The Goldman note, penned by analyst Brian Lee, warns that conventional reactor expansion combined with the SMR buildout is likely to produce a cumulative uranium supply deficit of approximately 2.3 billion pounds between 2025 and 2045.3 A deficit of that scale frames long-term contracting decisions for utilities and miners alike, and the equity market's Monday (2026-08-04) reaction suggests investors are treating the model change as a genuine shift in the demand outlook rather than a routine revision. [LIVE_PRICES]
The SMR addition is not academic. US utilities currently operate about 98 gigawatts of nuclear generating capacity, but very little has been built in recent decades, with high capital costs and lengthy licensing timelines the usual culprits.1 SMRs, defined as designs with a capacity of about 300 MW per unit or less, are the industry's answer to those barriers. Microreactors, a subset of SMRs, generally have a capacity of 20 MW or less and are pitched for off-grid and remote applications where grid connection is impractical.1
The fuel requirements complicate the supply math considerably. Several SMR designs use high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU, enriched between 5% and under 20% uranium-235 — a step up from the sub-5% low-enriched uranium used in most current reactors.1 HALEU enrichment capacity is thin, and the supply chain for it is nowhere near the scale needed to fuel a 46 GW SMR fleet by mid-century.
Regulatory momentum is building alongside the demand projection. The 759 MW Robinson Unit 2 in South Carolina received approval to operate until 2050 under new accelerated federal timelines, a signal that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is moving faster on license renewals.3 That extension keeps existing capacity running longer, supporting uranium demand while also delaying the point at which new reactor designs must prove their economics in a commercial setting.
India adds a separate layer of demand pressure. The country's roadmap targets 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047, with the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation accounting for about 54 GW and the remaining 46 GW to come from other public bodies, state governments, private companies, and joint ventures.6 India's three-stage program starts with natural uranium in pressurized heavy water reactors, then moves to plutonium recovered from spent fuel in fast breeder reactors, and ultimately aims to produce uranium-233 from thorium.6
India's push is one reason a fresh uranium supply arrangement with Australia carries weight beyond the headline tonnage. Australian uranium is among the lowest-cost sources globally. A deal that locks in long-term supply for India's reactor build tightens the contracting picture for other buyers competing for the same material.6
Private capital is responding to the demand signal. Eagle Nuclear Energy Corp. has engaged an AI and advanced-algorithm firm founded by a former Los Alamos National Laboratory theoretical physicist to support reactor simulation and optimization for its small modular reactor program.5 The company is one of several trying to compress the engineering timeline, using AI-driven simulation to validate designs before committing to physical test reactors.
But the gap between the demand forecast and the supply response remains wide. The 2.3 billion pound deficit Goldman projects assumes reactors actually get built on schedule, which has rarely happened in the nuclear industry's history.3 Delays in licensing, construction, and fuel supply chain development have a long track record of compressing demand projections over multi-decade horizons.
The enrichment constraint may prove more binding than the mining one. Even if the reactor buildout disappoints relative to Goldman's 46 GW projection, the fuel specification required by SMR designs means the effective constraint is not uranium in the ground but the ability to enrich it to near 20%.1 HALEU capacity is the specific bottleneck traders should price, not aggregate uranium supply. The next round of enrichment contracts will indicate whether the industry believes the Goldman demand math or is still waiting for the first commercial SMR to prove itself.3