Mitsubishi Builds Central European Tungsten Capacity as China Tightens Critical Mineral Exports
A ¥10 billion investment in Germany's H.C. Starck reveals how China's export restrictions are driving manufacturers to secure processing capacity in allied countries.
Mitsubishi Materials plans to invest ¥10 billion expanding tungsten production and recycling in Japan and Europe, placing Germany's H.C. Starck processing unit at the centre of the effort, Japan NRG Weekly reported in late May (2026-05-25). Output at H.C. Starck is set to rise 40% to 7,000 tonnes a year by 2029. China had by that point effectively halted exports of several heavy rare earths and gallium to Japan since December (2025), part of a broader tightening of critical mineral export controls.2
H.C. Starck's planned expansion follows an earlier acquisition that had already pushed Mitsubishi Materials' total tungsten supply capacity to approximately 15,000 tonnes annually, roughly six times its previous level, according to Japan NRG. Japan New Metals' Akita facility is also being doubled to 2,400 tonnes a year. Together the two expansions represent a push to build processing scale in Japan and allied European countries rather than remaining exposed to Chinese supply decisions.2
Germany's position in intermediate tungsten processing gives European manufacturers an alternative that cannot be created simply by sourcing ore from a new mine. Tungsten is used in cutting tools, defense components, and high-performance electronics. China controls a dominant share of global mine production, and any restriction on exports translates almost immediately into supply risk for manufacturers without an alternative processing route. H.C. Starck provides that route for European buyers.2
Competition for critical mineral supply chains has a defined leader at the financing level. AidData, the research group at the College of William and Mary, tracked roughly $98 billion in Chinese financing for mineral extraction and processing across 47 countries — a cumulative scale not yet matched by any single competitor.3
China's position was not accidental. In 1987, Deng Xiaoping declared that the Middle East had oil and China had rare earths, framing metals dominance explicitly as a strategic asset, the Economist noted. In the decades since, China built supply chain advantages across dozens of minerals, including accumulating significant cobalt reserves with a view to influencing market timing and pricing, according to OilPrice.com.1,4
Western governments are now committing capital at scale, though still trailing China's cumulative position. Since October (2025), the Pentagon committed $2.8 billion in equity and debt to eight mining and refining projects, targeting metals such as gallium and germanium that China has at times stopped exporting, the Economist reported. The US Export-Import Bank issued $15 billion in letters of interest for critical mineral projects over the past year, including $455 million for a rare-earth venture in the US and $350 million for cobalt and nickel in Australia. The Department of Energy separately approved $7 billion in domestic loans covering graphite, lithium, and potash.1
European governments are on a slower timeline. Norway launched a national critical minerals strategy on July 30 (2026-07-30), with trade minister Cecilie Myrseth saying Norwegian industry already supplies inputs important to allies' clean energy transformation, Energy Voice reported. Government strategy documents do not deliver processing capacity on the schedule that corporate acquisition and expansion can.5
Tungsten has not yet been subject to the Chinese export restrictions that have hit gallium and certain rare earths. But China's mine production dominance in tungsten is at least as significant, and the pattern of using export curbs on one mineral while leaving another temporarily open has not given manufacturers lasting certainty about future availability, Japan NRG noted.2
H.C. Starck's 7,000-tonne target is dated to 2029. If Beijing extends tungsten restrictions before that date, the gap between when supply tightens and when the German plant reaches full output becomes the exposure that buyers and competitors in the European processing chain are already trying to measure.2