QatarEnergy Spent $1 Billion on U.S. Spot LNG to Keep Asian Customers Supplied During Hormuz Closure
The state producer bought 33 American cargoes — up from four in the prior year — after Ras Laffan attacks severed its direct export routes to Asia.
QatarEnergy spent roughly $1 billion buying 33 spot LNG cargoes from the United States this year, substituting American supply for its own stranded output after attacks on the Ras Laffan complex and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz cut off its direct export routes to Asia, people familiar with the matter told Reuters. The purchases represent a more than eightfold increase from the four spot cargoes the company acquired in the prior year.6
The scale of the operation reflects how dependent Asian utilities and industrial consumers are on uninterrupted Qatari supply. Around 80% of Qatar's LNG exports are typically destined for Asian buyers, and QatarEnergy chose to absorb the cost of sourcing replacement cargoes rather than invoke force majeure broadly — a contractual right it holds but which market participants said the company wanted to use sparingly to protect relationships with buyers that have relied on it for decades.6
The Strait of Hormuz closed on February 28, 2026, immediately removing more than 10 billion cubic feet per day of global LNG supply from the market — roughly 20% of globally traded volumes — mostly from Qatar's Ras Laffan facility, according to EIA data.1,2
The price divergence that followed was sharp. ICE Endex TTF front-month futures climbed to $14.80 per MMBtu for the week ending April 24, 2026, 35% above pre-closure levels, EIA data showed. NYMEX Henry Hub front-month futures moved in the opposite direction, falling 9% from February 28, 2026 levels, as domestic supply remained ample and near-term export capacity was already running at 94% of maximum DOE-approved levels in March, up from a 91% utilization rate on estimated exports of 17.3 Bcf/d in February.1
That utilization ceiling meant U.S. terminals had little slack even before QatarEnergy began procuring at scale. Yet the cargoes were obtained. Of the 33 purchased, Kpler shipping data showed 28 had reached their destinations by July 30, 2026 (2026-07-30), with the remainder still en route to buyers in South Korea, Taiwan and India.6
Destinations span the full breadth of Qatar's Asian customer base: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, India and Bangladesh all received deliveries, Reuters reported. The buyers in that list include some of Asia's largest LNG importers, utilities that have built import infrastructure around the expectation of long-term Qatari supply.6
Ras Laffan remains the world's single largest LNG-producing facility, and the damage inflicted during the Iran conflict is expected to cost QatarEnergy approximately $20 billion per year in lost revenue, with repairs estimated to take up to five years, according to the company's own assessments.5,4
The pace of physical recovery has so far beaten the worst-case scenario. After the U.S. and Iran agreed a ceasefire that included reopening Hormuz for shipping in June 2026, QatarEnergy said it could restore 50% of LNG production within a month. By mid-August 2026, the company was said to be on track to restore 80% of pre-war output levels.4
Tanker movements reflect that trajectory. The LNG carrier Disha, chartered by India's Petronet, crossed the strait in June 2026, data from Kpler and LSEG showed, one of the first vessels to carry Qatari cargo through since the disruption began. By July 30, 2026 (2026-07-30), Bloomberg reported QatarEnergy had successfully sent a further cargo through Hormuz, three weeks after one of its carriers had been struck in the waterway and sat idle near the strait since early July.3,4
Still, the force majeure clause sits in the background of every long-term supply relationship Qatar holds. QatarEnergy activated it for some deliveries during the disruption but people familiar with the decisions said the company sought to limit suspensions, conscious of how structurally embedded Qatari gas has become in Asian power and industrial systems.6
The longer question is what five years of partial Ras Laffan output means for Qatar's expansion ambitions. QatarEnergy has committed to raising LNG production capacity from 77 million tonnes per year to 142 million tonnes annually by end-decade.6 Buyers in Seoul, Tokyo and Mumbai will be recalibrating how much volume comes back — and how quickly — before signing the next round of long-term supply agreements. The repair timeline, not the spot market arithmetic, is the number contract negotiators will be watching.5