Greece Pushes New LNG Terminal While Blocking EU Russian Shipping Curbs
A planned 4bcm floating import terminal accelerates southeast European gas diversification as Athens simultaneously resists EU restrictions on Russian LNG transit.
Greece is advancing plans for a 4bcm-per-year floating LNG import terminal at Dioriga while simultaneously lobbying Brussels against a proposed EU ban on transporting Russian LNG to third countries, a position that exposes the competing commercial interests shaping Athens' energy policy. Aktor, which has taken a 50% stake in the Dioriga project, told Montel on Wednesday (2026-07-15) that the terminal marks a significant step in southeast Europe's diversification from Russian pipeline gas.5
The two positions are not easily reconciled. Greek shipping companies have reportedly earned $3.8 billion transporting Russian oil, and industry estimates value each specialist LNG carrier at approximately $300 million, according to reporting published Thursday (2026-07-17). Athens has emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of the proposed EU transit ban, arguing it would disproportionately damage Greek shipping interests and strand billions in specialised vessels.6
The Dioriga terminal's stated purpose — replacing Russian pipeline volumes for southeast European buyers — sits directly alongside a commercial fleet that profits from keeping Russian LNG moving to Asian and other markets. That tension places Greece in an awkward position as the EU tries to tighten its energy sanctions architecture.
The regional context makes the terminal strategically relevant beyond Greece itself. Desfa, the Greek TSO, reported in May (2026-05-19) that Q1 LNG imports grew more than a third on the year, reaching 14.90 TWh from 10.96 TWh a year earlier, with LNG accounting for roughly 56% of total imports. More striking was the reexport surge: Greece nearly quadrupled gas exports to neighbouring markets to 5.99 TWh in Q1, primarily of regasified LNG, pushing total domestic gas demand up 18.5% year on year to 26.42 TWh.1
That reexport pattern signals Greece's ambition to serve as an LNG gateway for the western Balkans and southeastern EU members, most of which have limited direct import infrastructure. Bulgaria's Balkan Gas Hub launched a new LNG auction service in May (2026-05-20), with traders noting demand would grow as Russian pipeline volumes phase out. A Hungarian trader cited by Montel said LNG would play a key role for regional buyers once Russian deliveries stop in 2027.2
Russian pipeline supply has not yet collapsed. Entso-G data published in April (2026-04-09) showed Russia increased pipeline gas exports to Europe by 10%, or 5bcm, in the first quarter of this year against heightened winter demand, with TurkStream 2 flows averaging around 54 mcm per day over those three months. A cold snap in January and February drove demand from Hungary and Greece in particular, traders said at the time.4
That uptick complicates the diversification narrative. Southeast European buyers took more Russian gas in early 2026, not less, when winter conditions tightened supply. The 4bcm Dioriga terminal would add meaningful optionality to a region still running significant pipeline exposure, but it does not exist yet, and no commissioning timeline is contained in the available source material.
ICE Endex TTF front-month was priced at €57.51/MWh as of Friday's close (2026-07-18), a level that keeps LNG competitive against pipeline alternatives in Europe at current shipping rates but leaves limited margin if freight costs move sharply.
The scale of the Dioriga project relative to the regional pipeline baseline is worth noting plainly. In 2019, Russia supplied 11.26 bcm to the Balkans, with Greece alone taking 2.41 bcm, according to Gazprom data. A single 4bcm terminal does not replace that in full, but combined with Bulgaria's auction infrastructure and existing Greek import capacity, it narrows the gap materially for the sub-region.3
What Athens decides to do on the EU shipping ban is the more immediate policy variable. Greece's opposition could slow or dilute restrictions on Russian LNG transit, preserving commercial revenue for Greek carriers while maintaining European access to Russian supply flows indirectly through third-country routing. Whether Brussels can build a coalition to override that opposition — or whether the transit ban stalls entirely — will determine how much leverage southeast European buyers retain over their own diversification timeline.6