Houthis Move on Bab el-Mandeb as CENTCOM Restarts Hormuz Blockade
With both Gulf and Red Sea chokepoints simultaneously under threat, pipeline bypass routes cover only a fraction of normal Hormuz throughput.
U.S. Central Command restarted its blockade of all Iranian shipping and ports on Tuesday (2026-07-14), Foreign Policy reported, marking a clear break from the ceasefire and memorandum of understanding that had held between Washington and Tehran. The same day, Iran's contingency plan to activate Houthi pressure on Bab el-Mandeb — the strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden — was reported to be in effect.4
The Suez Canal had been the working alternative when the Strait of Hormuz was closed to commercial traffic earlier this year. In April (2026), 529 oil tankers transited the canal, 28% more than in April 2025, according to Egypt's state statistics agency CAPMAS. Monthly revenue reached $419 million, the highest since early 2024 when the first round of Houthi attacks forced tankers onto the Cape of Good Hope route, and overall vessel traffic across all types was up 14% year-on-year at 1,182 ships.3
A simultaneous threat to both waterways leaves producers and refiners with limited options. The Strait of Hormuz handled an average of 21 million barrels per day in 2022, roughly 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption, according to EIA data. Effective unused pipeline bypass capacity from the Arabian Peninsula amounts to an estimated 3.5 million b/d.1
The two main pipeline routes diverge sharply in their exposure to a Red Sea closure. Saudi Aramco's East-West crude pipeline, temporarily expanded to 7 million b/d of capacity in 2019, terminates at Yanbu on the Red Sea coast — meaning crude leaving through Yanbu still faces Bab el-Mandeb before it reaches open water. The UAE's pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman avoids both chokepoints entirely, offering 1.5 million b/d of capacity direct to the Arabian Sea.1
Asian buyers carry the largest direct exposure. EIA data from 2022 show that 82% of crude oil and condensate transiting Hormuz was destined for Asian markets. JKM, the benchmark for Asian LNG delivered cargoes, stood at $16.65 as of Tuesday (2026-07-14).1
ICE Brent crude front-month was at $85.14 by 21:35 UTC on Tuesday (2026-07-14), down 0.49% on the session. The subdued move, against reports of simultaneous threats to two of the world's most critical oil transit corridors, points to a market that may be discounting the news. Analysts noted earlier this year that investors appeared to have exhausted their capacity to respond to the region's shifting signals after crude surged 8% in a single session when U.S.-Iran talks collapsed.2
The earlier Houthi campaign in the Red Sea extracted a measurable toll before it subsided enough to allow the April (2026) traffic rebound. CAPMAS data show Egypt's authorities estimate at least $9 billion in potential Suez Canal revenue was lost during that disruption. That rerouting penalty — longer voyages, higher freight and insurance — evaporated quickly once traffic resumed. It would return if the Houthis re-established effective interdiction in the southern Red Sea.3
The arithmetic leaves little slack. Fujairah can move roughly 1.5 million b/d past any potential Hormuz closure. The Suez route can absorb large volumes, but only as far as Bab el-Mandeb permits. Against the 21 million b/d that Hormuz handled in 2022, neither alternative comes close to bridging the gap. How quickly Houthi targeting capability materializes in the Red Sea — and whether the U.S. naval presence already operating in the corridor can suppress it — will determine how much of that difference physical supply chains must absorb.1,4