Europe bets on Ukraine as its forward defence while still funding Moscow's war chest
European security planners now regard Ukraine as indispensable to continental defence, even as EU states paid Russia €2.9bn for LNG in Q1 2026.
European security planners have concluded they cannot defend the continent without Ukraine. That assessment, detailed in a Foreign Policy analysis published on Sunday (2026-06-29), reflects a significant shift in how NATO capitals are gaming out their long-term security posture as American commitments to the alliance remain uncertain.6
The strategic logic runs as follows: Ukraine has absorbed three years of Russian offensive pressure, inflicting costs that no other European partner could have accepted or replaced. Ukrainian forces destroyed more than 1,000 Russian tanks in less than a year of sustained combat, puncturing what one commentator described as the myth of Russian military prowess. Under former U.S. President Joe Biden, Washington sent $48bn in weapons and aid — roughly 5% of America's annual defence budget — to sustain that fight.3
But America's posture has shifted. European defence ministries are now running scenarios that assume little or no U.S. involvement, and in those scenarios, the Foreign Policy analysis found Ukraine's battlefield capacity effectively irreplaceable. Kyiv fields the only ground force in Europe with direct high-intensity conflict experience against Russian combined-arms tactics. No NATO member can quickly replicate that depth.6
The battlefield picture has tilted further in Ukraine's favour this year. By early June (2026-06-02), Ukrainian forces had carried out a series of strikes on Russian military plants and energy infrastructure more than 1,000 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. Russia scaled back its Victory Day parade in Moscow, a decision that would have been unthinkable in earlier years of the conflict, signalling constraint if not embarrassment.5
Yet Russia should not be written off. Analysts at the Atlantic Council cautioned in late May (2026-05-28) that headlines about Russian battlefield losses and human wave tactics obscure the country's remaining military potential. Moscow has adapted, retooled elements of its defence industry, and maintains the capacity to sustain attrition over a long horizon. The caricature of a degraded force has political utility for Kyiv but does not fully capture the operational challenge.4
The energy dimension complicates Europe's position. Even as EU governments channel weapons and financial support to Kyiv, they remain significant buyers of Russian gas. Environmental group Urgewald reported on Friday (2026-05-15) that EU countries paid Russia €2.9bn for approximately 5.1 million tonnes — equivalent to 6.9bcm — of liquefied natural gas in the first quarter of 2026, up from 4.3 million tonnes in the same period the previous year. Urgewald calculated that 97% of all Yamal Arctic LNG deliveries in Q1 went to EU buyers, making the bloc the indispensable market for Russia's flagship LNG export terminal.1
That dependency sits uneasily alongside European claims to be imposing meaningful economic pressure on Moscow. ICE Endex TTF front-month gas traded at €45.19 on Friday (2026-07-03), a level that keeps Russian LNG economics profitable even as the Kremlin pursues the war. The argument that sanctions and displacement of Russian pipeline gas have crippled Moscow's energy revenues is harder to sustain when its LNG volumes to Europe are rising year on year.
Russia's domestic gas production has not been spared. Output reached approximately 334.8 billion cubic metres by June, a decline of 3.2% compared with the same period a year earlier, according to federal statistics cited by Bloomberg. LNG production fell 5.1% to around 16.5 million tonnes in the same period. Pipeline exports to China via the Power of Siberia system are projected to rise more than 20% this year to approach maximum capacity of 38 billion cubic metres annually — a partial hedge for Moscow against European exposure — but Chinese demand has not grown fast enough to offset the loss of premium European markets at comparable netbacks.2
The near-term question for European policymakers is whether military and financial support can accelerate enough to shift the battlefield balance before winter tightens energy supply choices. Urgewald's data made clear that severing Russian LNG flows would impose immediate costs on European buyers as well as on Moscow — a constraint that has limited the ambition of the sanctions regime throughout the conflict. Whether EU governments advance plans to cap Russian LNG volumes in the next sanctions package, or defer again as supply alternatives remain thin at short notice, will determine how seriously Europe's security commitments translate into energy policy.1