China Has Bought $372 Billion of Russian Fossil Fuels Since the Ukraine War. The Next Pipeline Deal Is Stuck.

Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for talks with Xi Jinping, with a proposed 50 billion cubic metre gas pipeline at the top of the energy agenda—and little sign China intends to close the deal on Russia's terms. The visit underscores how completely Moscow has reoriented its hydrocarbon exports toward Asia since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. China has purchased more than €319 billion ($372 billion) in Russian fossil fuels since February 2022, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, providing Moscow with the hard currency to sustain military operations as Western sanctions cut off European markets. Russian goods shipped to China hit roughly $129 billion in 2024, nearly double pre-invasion volumes, with crude oil, coal and gas making up the bulk—all sold at a discount. Bilateral trade reached $234 billion in 2025. European gas imports from Russia collapsed from 157 bcm in 2021 to just 18 bcm last year, a loss Moscow has only partially offset through existing eastward infrastructure. The Power of Siberia pipeline delivered 38.8 bcm in 2025, marginally above its planned 38 bcm nameplate capacity, with an agreed ramp to 44 bcm annually. A separate Sakhalin pipeline deal targets up to 12 bcm by 2027. Even combined, that falls well short of the 177 bcm Russia supplied to Europe annually in 2018–2019. The proposed Power of Siberia 2 would run 2,600 kilometres from the Yamal Peninsula through Mongolia to northern China, adding 50 bcm per year. Russia signed what it described as a legally binding memorandum in September 2024, but a firm contract has not followed. A Kremlin aide said Monday the project "is on the agenda" for the Beijing meetings. A source close to Gazprom told Bloomberg this week that Russia had put forward a "very attractive pricing offer," but Chinese partners "have shown little enthusiasm." Moscow is targeting a gas price agreement by September. Beijing's posture reflects leverage, not indifference. China has locked in long-term LNG supply contracts with Qatar and expanded domestic regasification capacity, giving it alternatives that Europe lacked when Russian gas was cut. Russia, by contrast, has no comparable outlet for Siberian gas if the pipeline talks fail. The asymmetry runs deeper than energy. Russia imported nearly $116 billion in Chinese machinery, electronics and vehicles in 2024 to replace Western suppliers. Bloomberg reported China accounted for roughly 90% of Russia's sanctioned technology imports in 2025, up from 80% the previous year, including semiconductors and dual-use components. Russia pays premiums of nearly 90% above pre-war prices for goods routed through evasion networks—a structural cost that compounds as the war continues. Europe, meanwhile, traded one dependency for another. Approximately 57% of EU LNG imports came from the United States in 2025, up fourfold from 2021 levels. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis projects that share could reach 80% by 2030—a concentration that makes European gas supply vulnerable to US trade policy as much as Russian geopolitics. The September pricing deadline will determine whether Power of Siberia 2 advances or quietly stalls into another round of negotiations. A signed contract would lock in up to 50 bcm per year of Russian gas permanently diverted from any future European market by the early 2030s. A failure leaves Gazprom with stranded Siberian reserves and no viable buyer—which is precisely why China is in no hurry to concede on price.