ASEAN Leaders Head to Moscow for Energy Talks as Russia Presses Advantage After Iran Shock
Southeast Asian governments are engaging Russia on supply as the Hormuz crisis reshapes regional fuel markets and Moscow advances its pipeline agenda with Beijing.
ASEAN leaders are travelling to Moscow this week (week of 2026-06-22) for energy talks, Foreign Policy reported on Wednesday (2026-06-24), a visit that shows how Russia has moved to fill supply gaps opened by Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz.4
With Iran's output blocked and LNG cargoes rerouted or cut, regional governments scrambled for alternative suppliers. JKM, the Asian LNG benchmark, trades at $15.74. Moscow found its leverage in fuel-hungry Southeast Asia growing as buyers looked beyond the disrupted chokepoints for alternative volumes.4
Russia's energy push in the region has tracked a broader deepening of ties with China. President Vladimir Putin flew to Beijing on Wednesday (2026-05-20) for talks with Xi Jinping, with the long-stalled Power of Siberia 2 pipeline as a central agenda item. The Kremlin's foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov had said on Tuesday (2026-05-19) that the project "will be discussed in great detail between the leaders."3,2
The proposed 2,600-kilometre pipeline would carry 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually from Russia's Yamal fields to China via Mongolia, roughly doubling the volumes already flowing through the existing Power of Siberia 1 system, which delivers around 38 billion cubic metres per year. Both countries have separately agreed to expand Power of Siberia 1's annual capacity.2
China's appetite for Russian energy has grown measurably since the Iran shock. Official customs data show Beijing's imports of Russian oil jumped 35 per cent year over year in the first quarter. "The West Asia conflict strengthens Russia-China relations by reinforcing Russia's role as a key raw material supplier to China," Vasily Kashin of the Higher School of Economics told CNBC TV18.1,2
Pricing remains a sticking point. China reportedly wanted terms for Power of Siberia 2 to match Russia's domestic tariff of around $120-130 per 1,000 cubic metres, while Moscow is seeking rates closer to the existing Power of Siberia 1 contract. The gap reflects a familiar dynamic: Beijing's leverage as the only credible large buyer of Siberian gas, and Moscow's reluctance to extend deep discounts in a relationship it needs more than it publicly admits.2,3
ICE Brent crude front-month traded at $75.54 on Wednesday (2026-06-24), well below the peaks seen during the Hormuz disruption, suggesting markets have largely priced in supply reopening rather than a lasting structural shift. Yet the political realignment set in motion by the Iran war appears stickier than the price signal implies.4
Moscow sees growing Chinese interest in transit infrastructure as well as gas volumes. Russian officials have noted expanded interest from Chinese counterparts in land corridors through Russia and the Arctic Northern Sea Route, according to people familiar with the bilateral talks. Both routes would reduce dependence on sea lanes through contested chokepoints, a concern that has grown more concrete since the Hormuz closure.1
Southeast Asian countries sit in a different position. Unlike China, they lack geographic proximity to Russian pipeline gas and depend heavily on seaborne LNG and oil. The ASEAN delegation's Moscow trip suggests at least some governments see Russian energy ties — whether through future LNG supply arrangements or upstream investment — as a hedge against further Hormuz-style disruptions.
Power of Siberia 2 has been discussed for years without a final investment decision. The Iran war created the urgency Moscow needed to push negotiations forward, but the pricing gap with Beijing has not closed publicly. Whether the ASEAN engagement produces binding supply commitments or remains at the level of political signalling will determine how much of Russia's energy gain in Asia survives the shock that opened it.2,1