G7 Launches Critical-Minerals Alliance to Break China's Refining Grip

G7 Launches Critical-Minerals Alliance to Break China's Refining Grip The Evian pact targets the supply chains behind wind turbines, EVs and grid magnets, where China refines 19 of the 20 minerals the IEA tracks. The leaders of the G7 created a strategic alliance on critical minerals at their summit in Evian, France, a coordinated effort to loosen China's hold over the metals and rare earths feeding defense, automotive and clean-energy supply chains, oilprice.com reported on Saturday (2026-06-20).⁷ For energy markets the move lands on the input layer most exposed to Chinese policy. The rare-earth magnets used in wind turbines, EV drivetrains, industrial motors and grid hardware sit on a supply chain that the IEA ranks among the most concentrated at every stage of its value chain.⁷ The figures explain the alarm. China refines 19 of the 20 minerals the IEA has analyzed, at an average market share near 70%, the agency estimates. In rare earths last year it held 59% of mining, 91% of refining and 94% of magnet manufacturing.⁷ The magnet number is the one that has moved fastest. Two decades ago China accounted for roughly half of global production of sintered permanent magnets; that share has climbed to 94% as of 2026-06-20, by the IEA's reckoning. China also mines about 80% of the world's tungsten and refines 99% of its gallium, according to Economist reporting.^7,3 Western governments have been spending to change this, with little to show so far. The Trump administration is staging what the Economist called America's biggest intervention in commodity markets in decades, splashing cash on mines abroad. This month (week of 2026-06-08) the US House passed the bipartisan DOMINANCE Act, aimed at cutting US exposure after Beijing tightened critical-mineral export controls. Even with those deals and government backing, China has raised its market share over the past few years, the IEA notes.^4,6⁷ But China holds the choke point on minerals while remaining exposed at the other end of the energy trade. Its crude and gas still arrive by sea. In April, shipping disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz cut China's crude oil imports by about 20% year-on-year and its natural gas imports by roughly 13%, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air reported.² The squeeze forced real production cuts. State-owned refiners dropped runs to multiyear lows in the prior month after the near-halt of Hormuz shipments choked a vital crude channel, Bloomberg reported.⁵ Coal absorbed the shock. Total power generation rose an estimated 6.6% year-on-year, yet weak wind, subdued solar and extended nuclear refuelling outages pushed coal-fired output higher for a fourth straight month, CREA found. Thermal commissioning in the first quarter surged more than 160% year-on-year to a record, while solar additions fell 31% and wind additions rose 8%.² The contest has a Russian dimension. President Vladimir Putin travelled to Beijing on Tuesday (2026-05-19) to push the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, trying to turn Middle East energy disruption into momentum for a contract, Pipeline Journal reported. Analysts cast Russia as the junior partner in those talks, dependent on China for more than 90% of its imported technology.¹ Western supply additions, by contrast, remain conventional and slow. Equinor is moving ahead with a $412 million subsea development to lift output from Norway's Troll gas field, the kind of investment the G7 can still direct at home even as the minerals layer stays largely beyond its reach.⁷ The alliance announced at Evian shifts intentions, not capacity. Refineries and magnet plants take years to build, and China widened its lead even as Western money flowed in. For energy buyers the near-term exposure is unchanged: the magnets in every new turbine and EV motor still pass through Chinese processing, and China's own crude bill still rides on a single strait, with Brent crude near $80 a barrel as of the weekend (2026-06-21). The test is whether G7 spending finally lifts non-Chinese refining capacity above the roughly 70% share China now controls, or whether the next export-control notice from Beijing arrives first.^7,3