Brazil, Colombia and Mexico Stayed Out of Washington's Venezuela Move, Giving Beijing Room to Maneuver
Nine months after the U.S. seized Maduro, Latin America's three biggest economies still refuse to back Washington, keeping Chinese capital competitive across the region's commodity and infrastructure markets.
A War on the Rocks analysis published Thursday (2026-09-17) concluded that Washington's unilateral capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026 — following a military buildup in the Caribbean and strikes against vessels suspected of drug trafficking — has not reoriented Latin America's political geography in U.S. directions. Nine months on, the hemisphere remains divided along lines that carry direct consequences for commodity investment.6
ICE Brent crude front-month was trading at $104.88 per barrel on Friday (2026-09-18), keeping Venezuelan supply relevant to Atlantic basin crude markets. Venezuela's post-Maduro production framework has not taken publicly confirmed shape, leaving traders without a clear read on output trajectory.6
The regional response after January's intervention divided cleanly. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Panama and Paraguay welcomed Maduro's removal. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico — the region's three largest economies — did not, according to reporting from that period.1
Those three holdouts carry weight beyond the diplomatic optics. A Foreign Policy analysis from June 8 (2026-06-08) found that China's advantage in the Western Hemisphere stems from Beijing's ability to align financing, diplomacy, industrial policy and corporate activity behind long-term geopolitical objectives — a coordination the United States has struggled to replicate. Brazil and Colombia, both large commodity-exporting economies, are among the regional partners Beijing has cultivated through that integrated approach. Their distance from Washington's January action gives Chinese capital a more open path to deepen those relationships.4,1
Colombia adds a specific political variable. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella topped the first round of the country's presidential vote on Sunday (2026-05-31), advancing to a June 21 runoff against far-left contender Iván Cepeda, the Atlantic Council reported on June 1 (2026-06-01). Third-place finisher Paloma Valencia, who underperformed polling expectations, pledged her 1.6 million votes to de la Espriella shortly after results came in.3
The runoff placed Colombian policy on a contested trajectory at the worst possible moment for U.S. hemispheric strategy. Bogotá had already declined to back Washington's Maduro action, and polarized domestic politics made sustained alignment with any consistent external partner harder to establish.3,1
Latin America's internal fragmentation cuts across both camps. A Mexican official quoted by the Economist in May (2026-05-19) said Mexico opposes Russia's removal from the G20 while still describing the country as aligned with democratic institutions — a hedging posture that characterizes most of the region's major governments this year. Picking partners selectively, rather than committing to a bloc, is the dominant mode.2
That posture has deep roots. In 1826, Simón Bolívar convened the Congress of Panama to build hemispheric solidarity without the United States at its center. A Foreign Policy piece from July 15 (2026-07-15) noted that Latin American leaders of that era already held deep ambivalence toward Washington — welcoming the Monroe Doctrine's protection against European intervention while remaining wary of U.S. hegemony. The region's governments in 2026 are running a version of the same calculation, accepting elements of U.S. security architecture while keeping Beijing available on trade and investment.5
Brazil and Colombia, the two large commodity-oriented economies that declined to back Washington's January 3, 2026 action, carry outsized influence over whether U.S.-aligned or Chinese-backed capital structures define the region's next investment cycle. With ICE Brent front-month at $104.88 per barrel on Friday (2026-09-18), that outcome carries real market weight. Venezuela's production framework, still unresolved in the public record, is the next concrete signal to watch.6,1