Taiwan's Nuclear Restart Preparations Target 4.5 Million Tonnes of Annual LNG Displacement
Legal steps to reverse Taiwan's nuclear-free policy are advancing, with 3.9 GW of capacity offering the largest potential cut to its LNG import bill.
Taiwan is advancing legal preparations to restart nearly 3.9 gigawatts of nuclear generating capacity, a move that could displace between 4 and 4.5 million tonnes of annual LNG demand if both Maanshan and Kuosheng plants return to full service, according to reporting published Thursday (2026-09-17) by OilPrice.com. The Democratic Progressive Party has not formally abandoned its nuclear-free platform, but the practical legal barriers to resuming plant operation are being dismantled.4
JKM, the Asian spot LNG benchmark, traded at $26.75 per million British thermal units on Friday (2026-09-18). Taiwan's exposure to that price, buying spot cargoes in a market reshaped by Middle East conflict, is the commercial context driving the nuclear reconsideration.1
The reactor arithmetic is specific. Maanshan's two 951-megawatt units provide 1.9 gigawatts of gross capacity. Kuosheng's two 985-megawatt units add another 1.97 gigawatts. Restarting one Maanshan reactor could replace around 1 million tonnes of LNG a year; bringing both Maanshan units back online would substitute roughly 2 million tonnes, though the second restart is not expected before 2028.4
Adding Kuosheng roughly doubles the impact, bringing potential annual LNG displacement across all four reactors to around 4 to 4.5 million tonnes. Taiwan is a significant LNG importer, and volumes of that size carry weight in both spot and mid-term contract markets across the region.4
But the policy gap is real. The DPP's formal nuclear-free commitment has not been revoked; what has changed is the legal machinery beneath it. Those legal preparations take time, and the distinction between political position and regulatory clearance is what most directly affects when any capacity actually returns to the grid.4,3
The procurement dilemma is immediate. Taiwan must secure adequate LNG to cover the period before nuclear generation resumes, while retaining flexibility to reduce purchases if the reactors clear regulatory hurdles on schedule. Long-term LNG contracts are difficult to exit, and overshooting on contracted volumes would leave Taiwan holding expensive obligations after domestic nuclear output recovers.4
Taiwan's Ministry of Energy projects electricity demand will grow at an average annual rate of 2.5% over the next decade. That growth limits how much nuclear output can reduce net LNG imports: some of the restored gigawatts will meet incremental load rather than displace existing fuel purchases. The gross displacement figure of 4 to 4.5 million tonnes assumes a static demand baseline that does not hold.4
Taiwan has already taken short-term fuel decisions that reflect the pressure on its system. Two coal-fired units at the Mailiao Power Plant were restarted, and the 2.1-gigawatt Hsinta backup plant is being prepared for at least three months, with possible extensions. These are near-term stopgaps while the nuclear question resolves.1
The regional backdrop is not favorable for LNG sellers banking on sustained Asian demand. Wood Mackenzie, in a forecast published Tuesday (2026-07-14), projected Asia Pacific LNG demand is heading for a second consecutive annual decline, with Middle East conflict reshaping supply flows across the region. South Korea lifted capacity limits on coal plants and postponed 1.5 gigawatts of coal retirements; Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry suspended efficiency caps on older coal units through March 2027.2,1
The displacement effect of Taiwan's nuclear restart, if it happens on the stated timeline, would layer onto demand already under pressure from coal switching across the region. Sellers with long-term supply agreements into Taiwan face the clearer exposure; spot LNG traders can read the JKM curve and adjust.4,2
The issue most directly relevant to LNG procurement desks is whether the first Maanshan restart clears its legal and regulatory path before Taiwanese buyers lock into long-term supply contracts that cannot easily be reduced. If legal preparations slip into 2028 or beyond, the displacement math stays on paper. If clearance comes in 2027, procurement managers will need to act on that flexibility now — while JKM is still at $26.75.4