Uzbekistan Moves to Shrink Rosatom's Role in $9.5 Billion Nuclear Build
Tashkent's push to redirect construction contracts to local firms signals a shift in the terms of its flagship energy partnership with Moscow.
Three months after breaking ground alongside Vladimir Putin in a ceremony billed as a milestone in Russian-Uzbek energy ties, Uzbekistan is moving to cut Rosatom's slice of a $9.5 billion nuclear project. On September 2 (2026-09-02), President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signaled that Tashkent intends to secure a larger share of construction work for Uzbek contractors and workers, according to OilPrice.com, effectively narrowing the Russian state nuclear company's role beyond the financing and reactor supply it had appeared set to dominate.5
The groundbreaking had gone well on paper. On June 4 (2026-06-04), Putin told Mirziyoyev he was "confident you have chosen the best" partner for Uzbekistan's first cluster of reactors — the kind of ceremonial language that typically signals a deal is locked. Three months later, it is not. Mirziyoyev's September 2 (2026-09-02) statement on contractor shares rewrites the project's political architecture before a single reactor wall has been poured.5
The motivation is partly about domestic economics. Uzbekistan has watched its workers sustain Russia's labor market even as the bilateral relationship grows more complicated on the supply side. Official entries by Central Asian citizens into Russia for work fell to 1.9 million in the first half of 2026, down from 2.3 million in the same period a year earlier, a roughly 15 percent decline tracked by the business daily Vedomosti. Uzbeks still made up the largest cohort, at 1.1 million.4
Yet the money those workers send home has risen. Remittances from Uzbek guest workers reached $3.8 billion in Q1 2026, up 13 percent from Q1 2025. Russia's share of total Uzbek remittances slipped to 72 percent, or $2.75 billion, down from 78 percent a year earlier, a modest decline in absolute terms but a consistent directional shift.4
Russia's need for that labor is acute. The country currently carries up to 2.5 million vacant jobs, with unemployment estimated at 2 percent, a rate economists say sustains rapid inflation. By 2030, some projections put Russia's additional workforce requirement at 10.9 million to cover retirements and fill new positions. Central Asian workers remain an essential buffer. Tashkent is aware of what that means in any negotiation with Moscow.4
The nuclear project's renegotiation fits within a broader recalibration of Uzbekistan's partnerships. In mid-February 2026 (2026-02), the United States signed a critical minerals agreement with Tashkent, described as a Joint Investment arrangement giving Washington access to Uzbekistan's mineral resources. The resulting room for maneuver allows Tashkent to press Rosatom on contract terms without walking away from the deal's core value: the reactors themselves, which Uzbekistan cannot source domestically.3
Russia's fuel supply failures add a separate pressure on the relationship. By the end of June (2026-06-30), roughly 90 percent of Russian regions had reported fuel rationing or some form of supply disruption, according to statements from local authorities and media reports. That crunch has started reaching Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, the price of AI-92, a widely used gasoline grade, climbed 11.8 percent since early June (2026-06-01) to 13.9 million soums, or about $1,163 per ton, on the commodity exchange. Daily gasoline supply on the exchange fell around 50 percent on June 1 (2026-06-01) compared with the preceding week.2
The physical fuel crunch and the nuclear financing dispute are separate issues running in parallel. Both reflect a revision of the terms on which Russia and Central Asia do business. Kazakhstan's exposure illustrates how asymmetric these relationships remain: 95 percent of Kazakhstan's oil exports and 95 percent of its internet traffic pass through Russian territory, The Economist reported. For landlocked Uzbekistan, diversifying energy infrastructure is not optional.1
The URA uranium ETF gained 0.59 percent on September 7 (2026-09-07), though that move reflects broad sector dynamics rather than the Rosatom contract dispute specifically. The more consequential signal for project finance will come from Tashkent's contractor award schedule. A $9.5 billion program with no domestic precedent and a newly contested governance structure carries real execution risk, and Rosatom has not publicly confirmed the scope of any contract revision. Until Tashkent publishes specific awards and a revised financing structure, Mirziyoyev's September 2 (2026-09-02) statement remains declared intent rather than a restructured deal.5