India and Uzbekistan Sign Long-Term Uranium Supply Deal as New Delhi Accelerates Nuclear Buildout
The agreement, sealed during Modi's Tashkent visit, adds a second major Central Asian uranium source to India's fuel supply chain as it targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
India secured a long-term uranium supply arrangement with Uzbekistan on Sunday (2026-08-30), signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Tashkent as part of a broader elevation of ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The deal gives New Delhi another dedicated source of nuclear fuel outside the spot market as it races to expand its civil nuclear programme.5,7
India's push to lock in long-term supply contracts reflects the scale of what it has committed to at home. The country is targeting 100 gigawatts of nuclear installed capacity by 2047, a figure that would require a sustained, reliable fuel supply chain for decades.5 A single bilateral arrangement cannot close that gap alone, but each deal reduces dependence on opportunistic procurement and helps build the strategic reserves that planners say the programme requires.
Uzbekistan is not Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan holds approximately 14% of global uranium reserves and in 2025 produced 25,800 tonnes of uranium, with 13,500 tonnes attributable to Kazatomprom — roughly 20% of global primary output, according to Geopolitical Monitor data.1 Uzbekistan sits further down the production table, but still represents a meaningful diversification from any single counterparty.
India already has a significant Kazakhstan relationship. In 2015, Modi visited Astana and the two sides signed a contract for 5,000 tonnes of uranium over five years, a deal valued at over $4 billion, placing it among the largest uranium supply arrangements in Asia.1 In April 2026, Kazatomprom shareholders approved a related contract with 92.9% of votes in favour and 99.19% of voting shares represented — a clean endorsement, but one that leaves India exposed if Kazakh supply is disrupted or redirected.
The Uzbekistan deal therefore adds a second pillar to what New Delhi is building. Combined with a uranium supply agreement signed with Australia during Modi's visit to Canberra in July 2026, India has now moved on multiple fronts within months to secure long-dated supply. Australia allows long-term uranium exports to India for peaceful nuclear energy purposes under the July deal.3,4
The broader commercial frame around the Uzbekistan agreement is also notable. Bilateral trade between the two countries has crossed $1 billion, and both governments are now targeting $5 billion by 2030, backed by a new foreign-minister-led Coordination Council.6,78 Infrastructure connectivity, banking links and payment systems all feature in the partnership text.
China's positioning in the global uranium market gives New Delhi's procurement strategy some competitive urgency. Beijing has pursued equity stakes in mines in Namibia and Kazakhstan while building substantial domestic processing capacity, according to CEOWORLD analysis.2 India is not in an equity position in either Uzbek or Kazakh mines; it is buying supply under long-term contracts, which offers price predictability but no upstream ownership.
Supply concentration is a persistent structural risk for all uranium buyers. The top five producing nations account for close to 90% of global output, and Kazakhstan alone represents a dominant share of that, according to CEOWORLD data.2 Disruptions to Kazakh supply — whether from logistics, geopolitics or production constraints — have historically moved spot uranium prices sharply. India's multi-source strategy is a direct response to that concentration, even if the individual contract volumes are not yet disclosed.
The URA uranium ETF closed at $45.57 on Saturday (2026-08-29), down 5.89% on that session — a notable pullback that sits in tension with the stream of demand-side news coming out of India's bilateral diplomacy. Whether that divergence reflects broader market sentiment about near-term uranium supply adequacy or simply profit-taking is not clear from available data.
The key test ahead is not the signing but the delivery. India has a track record of signing nuclear supply agreements that take time to translate into actual fuel flows, given the regulatory, logistical and enrichment steps involved. The Ulba-TVS fuel assembly plant in Kazakhstan, which reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes of low-enriched uranium per year in 2024, gives some indication of the processing infrastructure that underpins Central Asian supply chains.1 How quickly Uzbekistan's uranium can be converted into reactor-ready fuel for Indian plants will ultimately determine the commercial weight of Sunday's (2026-08-30) announcement.